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In 1895, on the occasion of his retirement as Harvard Law School’s first 
dean,1 Christopher Columbus Langdell might have claimed—had he been an 
adept sloganeer—that he had overseen the creation of the first modern American 
law school, a law school for the twentieth century. The claim would have been 
eminently justified, but the prototypically reticent Langdell declined to make it.2 
Our days, however, are different: we live in a branded world in which we all 
perforce wear labels. Required to define its difference, the country’s 200th law 
 
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. 
1. BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C. 
LANGDELL, 1826–1906, at 8 (2009). 
2. Id. at 310. 
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school3 has declared that its goal is to be the ideal law school for the twenty-first 
century, and has named public service and interdisciplinarity the core elements of 
its vision.4 In part as earnest on the second of those commitments, it has 
identified history as a sufficiently important component of the ideal law school’s 
intellectual equipment to include the hiring of a historian among its earliest faculty 
priorities. And one without a law degree.5 At times during my first year in 
Southern California I have found myself wondering, “What would Langdell have 
thought?” 
In the world of legal education, we tend to remember Langdell as the 
progenitor of all that is regrettable. We trace law schools’ obsession with 
hierocratic credentialing to Langdell’s original installation at Harvard of a high 
standard, high cost regime of professional education in place of the low standard, 
low cost “commercial” regime that had prevailed thereto.6 Methods of instruction 
devoted to the inculcation of disciplinary technique rather than passionate 
commitments to republican virtue or social justice supposedly have their origins in 
Langdellian case method.7 Above all, Langdell is excoriated for dressing up 
doctrinaire legal formalism as a novel theory of law—a self-sufficient “science” of 
legal principles.8 Although it embraced Langdell’s model, the legal academy has 
always preferred to idolize rebel intellects who spurned the inheritance: Langdell’s 
near contemporary, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who famously derided the second 
edition of Cases on Contracts as the work of “the greatest living legal theologian”;9 
 
3. As of the end of 2008, the ABA lists 199 accredited law schools in the United States. ABA 
Approved Law Schools, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/alpha.html (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2010). Of law schools in the process of formation, both the UC Irvine School of Law 
and the Duncan School of Law of Lincoln Memorial University, Knoxville, Tennessee admitted their 
first class of students in August 2009. LMU School of Law Seats Inaugural Class, Lincoln Memorial 
University, http://lmu1.lmunet.edu/cgi-bin/MySQLdb?VIEW=/news/view_one.txt&newsid=654 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2010); UC Irvine Law School Opens Doors to Inaugural Class, University of 
California, http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/advocacy/youru0909/story4.html (last visited Nov. 
2, 2010). 
4. First-Year Curriculum Overview, U.C. Irvine Sch. Law, http://www.law.uci.edu/registrar 
/curriculum.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (presenting first-year course listings, which include 
coverage of criminal law, civil procedure, contracts, torts and constitutional law, in addition to 
offering innovative course offerings such as a rigorous, year-long lawyering skills course, a year-long 
course on the legal profession, and international law). 
5. As far as I am aware, very few non-J.D. history professors have had full-time appointments 
at U.S. law schools. They include Stanley N. Katz at the University of Chicago Law School (1971–78), 
Harry N. Scheiber at the University of California, Berkeley (1980– ), Paul Finkelman (University of 
Tulsa College of Law, 1999–2006, and currently Albany Law School, 2006– ) and William J. Novak 
(University of Michigan Law School (2009– ). 
6. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691, 693 (1995); 
KIMBALL, supra note 1, at 223–25. 
7. Carrington, supra note 6, at 693–95. 
8. Id. at 692. 
9. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233 (1880) (reviewing C.C. 
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH A SUMMARY OF THE 
TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (Boston, Little, Brown 1879) and WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES 
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Roscoe Pound, who distinguished the formal unreality of law “in books” from the 
social vitality of law “in action”;10 Realists such as Felix Cohen, for whom legal 
science “as traditionally conceived” was nothing other than “transcendental 
nonsense”;11 Realism’s progeny, all the way from Grant Gilmore12 to Duncan 
Kennedy.13 
Clearly the cartoon Langdell of law school lore would not find much to 
admire in the new UC Irvine School of Law, or its vision of legal education for the 
current century. What of the man himself? 
Langdell was not, admittedly, a known devotee of public service. During the 
early 1870s, for example, Langdell served as secretary of a “committee on 
jurisprudence”14 created by the American Social Science Association (ASSA), a 
reformist organization dedicated to inquiry into pressing social issues in the realms 
of education, public health, and social economy.15 To the ASSA (as we shall see), 
law was an instrument of social reform, and “jurisprudence” was law’s proper 
expression as such. To that end the ASSA created a “Department of 
Jurisprudence” charged with translating the Association’s deliberations into 
concrete legal action.16 The particular responsibility of Langdell’s committee was 
to inquire into the present state of “the science of jurisprudence” in the country’s 
universities and determine whether “jurisprudence” could actually fulfill the role 
the ASSA had assigned it.17 Langdell was profoundly skeptical. The ASSA’s 
attempt to use jurisprudence to link law to reform would not work because 
jurisprudence did not “specially concern lawyers” at all. It was for “those aiming at 
public life” (or, he added, archly, “a high order of journalism”). A lawyer’s concern 
was “the law as it is” not the law as it “ought to be.” The one was likely to generate 
“distaste” for the other.18 
Nor, if we went looking, would we discover in Langdell’s era any prescient 
buds of interdisciplinarity. Rather the reverse. In the professionalizing academic 
world of the later-nineteenth century, emphasis lay on the production of 
disciplinarity, not overcoming it. In establishing the terms of law’s professional 
 
OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1879)). 
10. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
11. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(1935). 
12. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977). 
13. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40–61 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
14. WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION 77 (1994). 
15. THOMAS HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE 
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF 
AUTHORITY 221 (1977). 
16. Id. at 105. 
17. Id. at 221. 
18. LAPIANA, supra note 14, at 77 (1994) (quoting C.C. Langdell). 
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and methodological differentiation from other subject areas and modes of inquiry, 
in creating a distinctively credentialed expertise, the Langdellian law school was on 
precisely the same track as every other sector of the modern university. Indeed, it 
was in the vanguard—so much so that Langdell has recently won recognition as 
one of the founders of modern professional (not just legal) education. He had 
begun his reform of Harvard Law School, after all, a good six years in advance of 
the appearance of the country’s first German-model graduate school at Johns 
Hopkins, the mother-church of Arts and Sciences disciplinarity.19  
All that granted, still the obloquy thrust upon Langdell is undeserved. As 
Bruce Kimball’s recent biography cogently observes, the Langdell who pioneered 
the case book and made original contributions to contract jurisprudence and 
equity jurisdiction did so in furtherance of a substantially more refined method of 
legal analysis than his critics have ever acknowledged, “a comprehensive yet 
contradictory integration of induction from authority, deduction from principle, 
and analysis of acceptability, which includes justice and policy.”20 Langell’s 
method actually led him to a subtle appreciation of the manner of common law 
reasoning that Holmes would later famously enunciate as the “paradox of form 
and substance”—accounting, perhaps, for Holmes’ constant struggle to create 
greater intellectual separation between them than actually existed.21 As classroom 
teacher, meanwhile, Langdell developed modes of instruction that rejected the 
prevailing tradition of recitation (memorization and regurgitation) and encouraged 
students to engage in active intellectual exchange.22 As educator, finally, Langdell’s 
innovations—from curriculum to hiring to academic administration—grounded 
legal professionalism on an abiding commitment to meritocracy.23 That 
commitment came accompanied by its own hypocrisies and blind spots: Langdell’s 
meritocratic sensibility did not extend to the admission of women to Harvard Law 
School or the graduates of Catholic colleges.24 Still, his model was sufficiently 
novel—both in expression and implications—that twenty-five years of struggle 
were required before it became fully sedimented as the standard for twentieth–
century legal education.25 
To comprehend fully the significance of Langdell’s model law school, one 
must assess it on its own decidedly innovative terms—just as the significance of 
Irvine’s attempt at a distinct model, and the mode of its implementation, must be 
assessed on its own terms. C.C. Langdell created modern American legal 
education’s disciplinary consciousness and point of institutional departure, but 
 
19. KIMBALL, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
20. Id. at 124. 
21. Id. at 124–28, 325–29. 
22. See generally id. at 140–60. 
23. See generally id. at 167–232. 
24. See generally id. at 271–308. 
25. Id. at 264. 
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professional legal education has journeyed far from its originary moment. Its 
development cannot be explained (or regretted) as the unfolding of some 
immanent logic inscribed upon it by a now-mythic founder. What then do 
Langdell’s Harvard and Chemerinsky’s Irvine share, other than the appellation 
“law school”? How should we understand the development of American legal 
education and of the legal scholarship it produces?  
Based on work that I have undertaken at various points during the last ten 
years, and which I am using as the evidentiary and argumentative basis for much 
of this article, I shall argue here that legal education is best understood as one of 
the most important processes contributing to the development of the modern 
American juridical field, which I define as the intrastructural ensemble of 
personnel and institutions (lawyers, judges, and legal academics; courts, state 
agencies, professional associations, and law schools) individually and collectively 
engaged in the systematic and continuous reinvention of “law” as a process of rule 
production controlled by professionalized juridical institutions and practices. In 
this field, juridical institutions and professional and academic disciplines 
(principally law and the social sciences), together with a variety of outside actors, 
collude and compete to influence the substance of the rules (the legal technology) 
produced to govern state, economic, and social practices.26 
The process of rule production is not static because its environment is 
continuously changing. As its environment changes, the process must 
continuously produce itself and its rules anew. The dynamic of continuous 
reproduction is also influenced by extrinsic rule regimes. For example, processes 
of knowledge production—the creation and evolution of the various forms of 
expertise that compete to inform the substance of the law—have their own rules 
of formation, also undergoing continuous change, dating to the professional and 
organizational revolution that brought about the advent of “the disciplines” in the 
late nineteenth century.27 Processes of influence production involving outside 
actors—for example, investment in personal relations (cronyism), investment in 
politics (lobbying), and investment in legal/social scientific research—have their 
own rules of formation too, generally responsive to the social, political, and 
economic context within which outsiders, such as capitalists, labor unions, NGOs, 
and other organized social groups compete for influence in rule formation 
processes. Rule production, in short, has an extrastructure as well as an 
 
26. See Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Field of Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical 
Narrative, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 911 (2000); Christopher Tomlins, History in the American Juridical Field: 
Narrative, Justification, and Explanation, 16 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 323 (2004); Christopher Tomlins, How 
Autonomous is Law? 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 45 (2007); Christopher Tomlins, The Strait Gate: The Past, 
History, and Legal Scholarship, 5 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 11 (2008). For the concept of a “juridical 
field,” see Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field (Richard Terdiman 
trans.), 38 HASTINGS L. J. 805 (1987). 
27. THOMAS BENDER, INTELLECT AND PUBLIC LIFE: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
ACADEMIC INTELLECTUALS IN THE UNITED STATES at 34, 39–46 (1993). 
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intrastructure.28 
The production of legal rules, however, is most particularly determined in 
the complex of juridical-legal ideologies, behaviors, discourses, and institutions 
that collectively comprise “the world of the law” (the juridical field). As a rule of 
law regime, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century United States privileges law 
rule. That is, the U.S. identifies “law” as its preferred structural and discursive 
modality of rule.29 Hence law and its institutions occupy a position of advantage 
that sets the terms and limits of discussion—“the key terms of legitimacy”—in 
interactions with other modalities and ideologies of action over the substance of 
the rules.30 The production of rules, in short, takes place within an established 
structure of legal practices—discursive, institutional, organizational—that 
continuously and actively reinforce the U.S.’s inertial political-cultural tendency 
toward the privileging of law in rule production. Although periodically contested 
by competing disciplinary complexes, rule production has never been captured or 
transformed by them.31  
As a historian, I am interested in understanding the history of the process of 
rule production and of the distinctive legal practices that structure it in the U.S. 
case. But I also have a particular interest in delineating the role—and fate—of 
“history” itself as an activity, both professional and ideational, relevant to the 
determination of the contours of the modern American juridical field, and to the 
legitimation of its rule production processes.32 
In the case of law, history has been more than a source of “perspective,” an 
observational standpoint. In the nineteenth century, first in Germany and 
subsequently in the Anglophone common law tradition, history—in the form of 
“historical legal science” (geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft)––furnished the first grand 
theory of legal development.33 By the last years of the century, however, the 
organic-evolutionary premises of this so-called “historical school” of law had been 
seriously eroded by the era’s sudden, massive, and transformational political, 
social, and economic shifts. Simultaneously, the historical school’s claims to have 
developed a “science” of law were challenged by, on the one hand, the emerging 
social sciences, with their self-announced superior grasp on theorized social 
 
28. See generally Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy, in 
GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (discussing rule production 
processes). 
29. For the concept of law as a “modality of rule,” see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, 
LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 19–34 (1993). 
30. Dezalay and Garth, supra note 28, at 307. 
31. See Tomlins, History, supra note 26, 325–27, and generally Tomlins, Framing, supra note 26 
(discussing disciplinary competition between law and social science disciplines). 
32. See generally Tomlins, History, supra note 26 (discussing the history of “history in the 
American juridical field”). 
33. Id. at 348–59. 
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knowledge; and, on the other, by law’s parallel disciplinary turn toward reinvention 
and redefinition as a distinct and self-contained scientific expertise of its own. Like 
all other disciplines, law turned inward, claiming to be able to explain itself, 
exhibiting only occasional interest in theories of itself grounded in other domains 
of knowledge. The remnants of the historical school that remained within this 
increasingly autonomous legal sphere turned into “legal history”––a desiccated 
intellectual activity that had shriveled from a once expansive theory of legal 
evolution to a merely descriptive account of how law had always been the 
autonomous discipline it had only recently become. This legal history had little in 
common with the formerly related but now diverging disciplinary practices of 
professional history and political science. It had no particular reason for being, 
other than as an antiquarian hobby that validated what the field had turned into.34 
Legal history did not manifest a clear sense of purpose again until the 1960s, 
largely as a result of the influential “new” socio-legal perspective pioneered by 
James Willard Hurst.35 In the half century since then, growing numbers of legal 
historians located both within and outside the juridical field have developed a 
variety of modes of analysis and explanatory archetypes (functionalism, 
instrumentalism, social construction, different varieties of the “constitutive” trope) 
but no overarching conceptual-organizational narrative for their field. Rather the 
reverse. Like historical (and social scientific) practice at large, legal history has 
become deeply enmeshed in the conflicts over generalization and causation that 
pit truth-claims about substance against theories of meaning and interpretation 
that emphasize the contingency of all relational phenomena and identify 
“complication” of received understandings as the task of scholarship. 
In the remainder of this article, Part I offers an abbreviated account of the 
development of the juridical field in the U.S. case. Part II offers an appraisal of the 
role played by legal history inside and outside the juridical field, focusing in 
particular on its successes and failures in constructing a coherent theory of history 
of and for that field through the early 1970s. Part III concentrates on the 
particular significance of “Critical Legal History” and “Critical Historicism,” the 
development of which between the 1970s and the turn of the twenty-first century 
coincided with the rapid growth of legal history as a field of practice.  
In unpacking first the development of the juridical field and then the 
varieties of American legal history, my goal is to establish grounds for a 
 
34. Robert W. Gordon, Recent Trends in Legal Historiography, 69 LAW LIBR. J. 462, 462–63 
(1976); but see David M. Rabban, The Historiography of The Common Law, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
1161 (2003) (emphasizing the vitality of late nineteenth-century legal historical scholarship); see generally 
Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981) (describing multiple 
modes of relationship between historical and legal scholarship during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries). 
35. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in 
American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 9 (1975–76) (providing a broad overview of the 
field of legal history since the 1880s and an assessment of Hurst’s impact). 
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conceptualization of legal history as a “structural history of the creation and 
production of national legal practices.”36 This is described in Part 4. By this I 
mean a form of history that approaches law neither as an organic or evolutionary 
phenomenon, nor as one to be understood functionally or instrumentally, nor as 
one that is socially constructed or mutually constituted, but rather identifies law as 
the product of the juridical field’s processes of rule production and as the source 
of the rules by which the process of rule production itself is governed. In Part 5, I 
will conclude by returning to where I began––the interdisciplinary/public service 
turn that UC Irvine’s School of Law has embraced—to offer a series of 
speculations on the reasons for UCI’s choices informed by the article’s account of 
the American juridical field and of the place of history in the field’s research 
agenda.  
I. LAW: THE AMERICAN JURIDICAL FIELD 
Law in the contemporary United States has achieved a largely unchallenged 
ascendancy as the principal arena and discourse of decision making in social and 
political affairs. Law’s ascendancy is rooted generally in a historically supportive 
political (“rule-of-law”) culture, and particularly in continuous processes of 
institutional and ideological self-renewal, the purpose of which is to maintain law’s 
ascendancy in rulemaking processes through innovations in legal education and 
professional structure, while simultaneously generating popular confidence in the 
legitimacy and efficacy of the rules that are produced. Legitimacy at large is 
grounded upon repeated invocation over time of foundational values embodied in 
national legal-cultural practices associated with the juridical form—that the law is 
objective in application (no one is above the law), universal in implementation 
(one law for all), neutral in outcome (the law does not take sides) and supremely 
authoritative (a government of law, not men). Together, these values compose 
law’s aesthetic meta-character—the normative idealization of the workings of law 
in the social world—that in turn sets the discursive conditions for processes of 
rulemaking. The actual process of rulemaking thus occurs within the frame of 
national legal practices, institutional and ideological, that constitute the world of 
the law itself. Generally true since the creation of the original republic in 1787, this 
has been particularly the case since the crystallization of those practices in their 
modern form in the half century after 1870. 
As resort to law has proliferated over the last 150 years, however, actual 
“legalities”—the prevailing legal conditions of social life—have been produced 
not through the polite elaboration of holistic juridical narratives but far more 
often in another set of practices: collusive or competitive struggles, adversarial or 
bureaucratic, to achieve specific outcomes that serve the interests of specific 
clienteles. Individuals, agencies, interest groups, corporations and social 
 
36. Dezalay and Garth, supra note 28, at 311. 
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movements (including, of course, legal professionals themselves) make particular 
self-serving investments in law, and mobilize a vast range of resources—material, 
ideological, disciplinary—to that end. The availability of law for such widespread 
use furnishes practical quotidian arguments for law’s social efficacy, but by its very 
nature resort to law is necessarily subjective, selective, and partial. Resort to law is 
generally indifferent to, and may even contradict, law’s meta-character. 
Law’s aesthetic meta-character—and thus its overall social authority—is 
endangered when daily piecemeal legality is produced in competitive, self-serving 
processes. How does law avoid undermining itself, or being undermined, by its 
own practices?  
Maintenance of law’s overall social authority in this environment is the 
principal concern of the complex of institutions, actors, and ideologies that 
collectively comprise “the world of the law,” or in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms “the 
juridical field.”37 The major actors in the field are organized in the juridical 
professions—bench, bar, and academy. Here lies the greatest interest in sustaining 
both the practical authority of law’s place in rulemaking in the face of the 
particularism and fragmentation bred by fissiparous social and state usage and the 
ideological legitimacy of law’s claim to a unique discursive authority to set the 
terms on which rules are made. That is, the field works at two levels. First, within 
the actuality and effects of instrumental usages that their members’ dedication to 
particular clients, or outcomes, or ideas produces, the juridical professions 
perform a crucial managerial role in the American rule-of-law state formation by 
taking responsibility for the maintenance of a representation of law that can 
sustain its claims to ascendancy in rulemaking. Second, above the level of 
instrumental usage, the juridical professions act to validate law’s proclamations of 
objectivity, neutrality, and universality by discursively working law pure, whether 
by endorsement, reform, or critique. 
I use the term “juridical field” to encapsulate what might otherwise be 
termed “the world of the law” because talk of “law,” or “the law,” or “the rule of 
law” or “the world of the law” always evinces a certain vagueness. Precisely what 
do these terms encompass? “Juridical field” answers that question by 
concentrating our attention on the intersection of discourse, behavior, and 
institutions. “Field” means an area of “structured, socially patterned activity or 
‘practice’” that is defined “disciplinarily, and professionally.”38 Organizationally 
and conceptually, a field is centered on “a body of internal protocols and 
assumptions, characteristic behaviors and self-sustaining values” that unite 
materiality with ideation, ceremonial with outcome, action with ideology.39 In 
law’s case, the juridical field is responsible both for the production and 
 
37. Bourdieu, supra note 26. 
38. Id. at 805. 
39. Id. at 806. 
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reproduction of national legal practices, particular and general, and for their 
overall effectivity.  
Specifically how has this task been performed? What resources have been 
used? Here I explore these questions schematically, concentrating in particular on 
the period from 1870 onward. I present the component elements of the juridical 
field in their early unorganized configurations during the first century of U.S. 
history; the social, intellectual, and institutional conditions that prompted the 
crystallization of the field in its modern configuration in the late nineteenth 
century; the reasons for its formation; the legal aesthetic and practices that 
crystallized with it; and its later manifestations. The exploration as a whole is 
organized in three chronological phases—the phase of revelation, the years prior to 
1870; the phase of production (1870–1940); and the phase (since 1940) of serial 
attempts at innovation in light of production’s increasingly obvious insufficiency. 
A. Revelation 
Revelation is the key to the world of law’s antebellum intellectual and 
organizational configuration, persisting through the 1870s. Prior to the 
professionalization of legal education, lawyers acquired specifically legal 
knowledge by rote learning and by observation and repetition of legal practice, 
overwhelmingly through apprenticeship.40 Both proprietary and university law 
schools attempted systematic training in legal principles by mounting courses of 
lectures and by promoting directed study of key texts, but there too absorption 
and regurgitation of detail was emphasized.41 At the level of general intellectual 
inquiry, however, law and lawyers shared in the organization of knowledge 
through the contemporary conjunction of naïve Baconian empiricism (“science”) 
with evangelical Protestantism. What emerged was a mode of discourse in which 
law knowledge could harmonize institutionally with other modes of “scientific” 
inquiry in undifferentiated and localized organizations, such as lyceums.42 
Culturally, law was an integral component of local and regional networks of 
respectability and gentility—“communities of the competent.”43  
The formation of the American Social Science Association (ASSA) in 1865 
signified both the climax and endpoint of this mode of intellectual organization. 
 
40. Hugh C. Macgill & R. Kent Newmyer, Legal Education and Legal Thought, 1790–1920, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 37–40 (Michael Grossberg and Christopher 
Tomlins eds., 2008). 
41. Id. at 45–48; Alfred S. Konefsky, The Legal Profession: From the Revolution to the Civil War, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 40, at 78–83; KIMBALL, supra note 1, at 
34. 
42. LAPIANA, supra note 14, at 29–32; Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The 
Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 421, 
421–26, 431–55 (1999). 
43. HASKELL, supra note 15, at 65–68; See generally DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH 
GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 446–82, 613–57 (2007). 
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Informed by the example of the U.S. Sanitary Commission, which had been 
created during the Civil War by northeastern philanthropic elites,44 the ASSA was 
established to address the mounting crises of U.S. urban-industrial development 
by providing a translocal forum for the production and dissemination of socially-
useful knowledge that could inform national state practice across a wide range of 
reformist activity, specifically “the Sanitary Condition of the People, the Relief, 
Employment, and Education of the Poor, the Prevention of Crime, the 
Amelioration of the Criminal Law, the Discipline of Prisons, [and] the Remedial 
Treatment of the Insane.”45 Responsibility for investigation was divided 
substantively among three departments—Education, Public Health, and Social 
Economy. The ASSA’s departmental organization did not embody particularist 
commitments to distinct investigative or analytic methods; its founders and 
members were gentleman amateurs whose curiosity touched upon the “numerous 
matters of statistical and philanthropic interest which are included under the 
general head of ‘Social Science’,” and whose authority lay in their elite status and 
their demonstrations of “sound opinion.”46 Straightforward fact gathering and 
topical discussion would enable each department to transcend the incapacities of 
traditional state structures in responding to social problems.  
Singular in this structure was the role accorded the ASSA’s fourth 
department, the Department of Jurisprudence. Its mission was to consider both 
“the absolute science of Right,” and “the Amendment of laws.”47 The former 
embraced a general meta-character for law entirely in harmony with the normative 
scientism of the ASSA’s general project; the latter identified law’s specific role as 
the point of final resort for implementation of the solutions envisaged by the 
ASSA’s other departments. That is, once specific departmental investigations had 
fully ascertained “the laws of Education, of Public Health, and Social Economy,” 
the task of the Department of Jurisprudence was to oversee the translation of 
these social and human laws into “the law of the land.”48 Governments were 
expected to yield to the sound opinion of the most competent in the definition 
and resolution of social problems as a matter of course; the Department of 
Jurisprudence would register the results of their deliberations in national law, 
creating social harmony as an instantiation of the “absolute science of Right.”  
B. Production 
If revelation stands for the conception of law as a naïvely empiricist science of 
social laws that emerged from the genteel intellectual tradition of the antebellum 
 
44. GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS 
AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION 98–112 (1965). 
45. HASKELL, supra note 15, at 98 (quoting Franklin B. Sanborn). 
46. Id. at vi, 87. 
47. Id. at 105. 
48. Id. at 105–06. 
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nineteenth century, production stands for what succeeded it, the phase of formation 
of the juridical field in its first, recognizably modern, configuration. By the end of 
the century, the organization of intellectual discourse was driven by disciplines, 
modes of specialized academic inquiry and professional self-identification defined 
in universities rather than in the public pronouncements and commonsense beliefs 
of gentlemanly elites. The social sciences became “university-based, research-
oriented” enterprises, each with its own community of full-time practitioners 
developing new methods of inquiry and conceptions of causation, each seeking 
equal stature for their particular domains of expertise.49 Beginning in the 1880s, 
the creation of disciplinary associations—the Modern Language Association 
(1883), the American Historical Association (1884), the American Economic 
Association (1885), the American Political Science Association (1903), the 
American Sociological Association (1905)—signified serial acceptance of this 
differentiated model of expertise.50 Law’s classical antebellum claims to 
ascendancy—the “characteristic references to legal knowledge as the product of a 
gradual, incremental process of discovering and perfecting natural laws” 
embedded in the ASSA’s conception of “jurisprudence”—were increasingly at 
odds with modes of inquiry that “understood theory as provisional, relative to the 
current economic and technological order,” and that “defined rights, law and state 
forms as cultural creations, shaped by the conditions and needs of a particular 
historical context and subject to experimentation, growth and change.”51 In place 
of an “absolute science of right,” the disciplines reimagined law as the 
instrumental output of legislatures. Legislatures were themselves reimagined as 
sites for the inculcation and application of disciplinary knowledge. 52  
This elevation of non-juridical state structures and accompanying re-
theorization of law as the product of legislative mechanics informed by expertise 
in social knowledges was a major challenge to law.53 Hence the phase of production, 
succeeding revelation, describing law’s encounter with and adoption of specialized 
ideologies of investigation and training that would hold sway for most of the next 
century, the century of American modernism and industrialism. Production stands 
for the breakdown of a generalized and naïve ideology of science; the 
reconstitution and reorganization of professional social expertise as related but 
distinct discourses—“law” and “the disciplines”—with separated self-defined 
 
49. Id. at 166, 234. 
50. BENDER, supra note 27, at 43. 
51. Mary O. Furner, The Republican Tradition and the New Liberalism: Social Investigation, State 
Building, and Social Learning in the Gilded Age, in THE STATE AND SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN BRITAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES 174 (Michael J. Lacey and Mary O. Furner eds., 1993). 
52. See, e.g., LESTER FRANK WARD, DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY OR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE, 
vol. I, 37–40, vol. II, 501–02 (Greenwood Press 1968) (1883). 
53. Id. at vol. II, 501, 502; Michael J. Lacey, The World of the Bureaus: Government and the Positivist 
Project in the Late Nineteenth-Century, in THE STATE AND SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN BRITAIN AND 
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 51, at 142–43, 152. 
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purposes; the beginnings of the critical encounter between them; the revolution in 
practices that resulted; and the spaces—institutional and ideological, educational 
and governmental—in which that encounter occurred.  
Langdell’s Harvard stands as the first attempt at, and lasting influence on, the 
reconstitution of the juridical field in modern form during this period. Though it 
required twenty-five years of hard academic labor, Langdell professionalized legal 
education by reworking it as the elaboration of a specific case- and court-centered 
knowledge, attained through explicit and defined methods of inquiry, defended by 
exacting institutional standards, and applicable in any locale.54 He was to the 
reconstitution of legal education and the production of law what his younger 
contemporary, Frederick Winslow Taylor, was to the reconstitution of industrial 
work and the production of manufactured goods. Each in his distinct sphere was a 
transformational influence on the half century after 1870, each a pioneer 
innovator who attempted to reinvent the institutional and the conceptual 
apparatus of a field of endeavor by creating new protocols and behaviors at its 
center. At the heart of his innovations, each located “an attitude of questioning, of 
research, of careful investigation . . . of seeking for exact knowledge and then 
shaping action on discovered facts.”55 Each experimented with methods of 
systematic “case” study to gain purchase on his core subject, using discrete 
instances to pick apart and examine accepted practices, strip them to their 
constituent details, and reconstitute them in new ways that suggested reorganized 
institutions and reorganized people. Each identified education and training as such 
as a central avenue of response to contemporary industrial society’s transforming 
demands. Each saw education and training as deliberately conceived and 
deliberately managed processes that inculcated appropriate and useful “skills.”56 
The Langdellian revolution in legal education and training, and the 
reimagination of law as a technical expertise that the revolution championed, 
established the groundwork for widespread transformation in U.S. national legal 
practices. It created new “rules for the production of the rules.”57 In elite eastern 
law schools, countermovements—notably sociological jurisprudence and legal 
realism—signified discontent with Langdell’s legal “formalism” but not with the 
underlying logic of the new juridical field’s hermetic structure. Neither would 
furnish a clear intellectual basis for an alternative structural regime. Instead each 
ended up furthering the process of innovation that had created the new field. 
Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence came closest to disrupting the 
 
54. See generally KIMBALL, supra note 1. 
55. Majority Report of the Sub-Committee on Administration of the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, The Present State of the Art of Industrial Management (1912), as quoted in DANIEL 
NELSON, FREDERICK W. TAYLOR AND THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 198 (1980). 
56. TON KORVER, THE FICTITIOUS COMMODITY: A STUDY OF THE U.S. LABOR MARKET, 
1880–1940, 59–72 (1990); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM 
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 54–57 (1983); Carrington, supra note 6, at 704. 
57. Dezalay and Garth, supra note 28, at 311. 
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shape of the new field. In advocating the “socialization” and “organization” of 
law—that is, attention to the social context and consequences of juridical decision 
making and administrative reform of juridical institutions in order to deliver 
systematic “social justice”—sociological jurisprudence stood as a practice precisely 
at the strategic nexus between Langdell’s insistence on the maintenance of judicial 
ascendancy in lawmaking and the discipline-based social knowledges that were 
competing with court-centered law to furnish the state’s policymaking discourse.58 
During his pre-Harvard career in Chicago, Pound had founded the American 
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology at Northwestern University to explore 
that nexus. He used the Institute’s Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology to put 
lawyers and judges in mutually beneficial contact with “experts in the disciplines 
of social science, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, and social work.”59 Chicago’s 
new Municipal Court system, established in 1906, provided a concrete example of 
Pound’s nexus in action—a centralized and bureaucratized administration of 
criminal law animated both by discipline-based therapeutic ideologies of social 
intervention and “treatment” of individuals, and by eugenic strategies of 
population management.60  
Chicago’s example suggests that, in the state, pressure on law from the new 
social knowledges resulted in accommodations of discipline-based social science in 
concrete juridical practice long before the late 1920s, when legal realists 
announced legal academia’s realization of the possibilities inherent in the 
encounter. Examined closely, however, these apparently novel state practices also 
demonstrate the institutional and ideological resilience of law when confronted by 
the progressives’ policy sciences. When “law” as a discourse of rule production 
came under pressure from social scientists’ proposals to create alternative venues 
for the application of specialized knowledges, law’s essential court-centeredness 
remained intact precisely because Langdellian technicality had affirmed the 
primacy of the law made by the judge, and of the court as the place where law was 
made. Embodied in the Chicago case, that is, one may see that the Progressive 
Era’s therapeutic ideal of “socialized law” was in fact as much a demonstration of 
the juridical field’s capacity to maintain law’s ascendancy over the disciplines in 
rule production as it was a recognition of the disciplines.  
Nor, at least in Pound’s sociological jurisprudence, can one detect any desire 
to alter that ascendancy. Sociological jurisprudence recognized the divergence 
between textual law and law’s actual social expression. Law, crystallized in text, 
was forever left behind by the ceaseless wash of change that was social life. As 
Pound saw it, after lively innovation for most of the nineteenth century (the 
“formative era” as he would later dub it), American juridical thought by the end of 
 
58. MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA 
CHICAGO 96–98 (2003). 
59. Id. at 106. 
60. Id. at 104–15. 
Loftus_Geis_Macro_v1 (Do Not Delete) 3/16/2011 11:31 AM 
2011]  WHAT WOULD LANGDELL HAVE THOUGHT? 201 
 
the century was no longer attuned to “meeting new situations of vital importance 
to present day life.” While the new social sciences had successfully grounded 
themselves on “the economic and social interpretation” of life, law was adrift in a 
sea of formalist self-referentiality, committed to ideas and patterns of thought that 
had long “ceased to be vital,” no longer catching up to action.61  
Sociological jurisprudence proposed to interrupt law’s self-referentiality by 
counterposing law to society rather than to itself. How was this new exterior social 
world to be apprehended? Pound proposed to look the facts of human conduct in 
the face, but his way of doing so was actually to look to expertises that would tell 
one what “the facts” were and what they meant: “Let us look to economics and 
sociology and philosophy, and cease to assume that jurisprudence is self-
sufficient.” And once the facts of human conduct had been discovered by resort 
to the expertises that revealed them, the juridical sphere would take over, acting by 
resort to law, its own expertise, to regulate them. “It is the work of lawyers to 
make the law in action conform to the law in the books, not by . . . eloquent 
exhortations to obedience of the written law, but by making the law in the books 
such that the law in action can conform to it.”62 Making “the law in the books 
such that the law in action can conform to it” was work that only lawyers could 
do.63 Indeed, Pound’s entire career was actually dedicated to maintaining and 
defending the autonomy of the juridical sphere in its relations with the social. 
Never was this clearer than in his deep antagonism during the 1930s to the 
emergence of the modern administrative state, or in his celebratory history of “the 
formative era” of American law, written in 1936 as a series of lectures, which 
stressed that American law possessed its own fountain of historical continuity, a 
“taught legal tradition” immune from generalized social influence that produced 
adaptive alteration under the wise direction of experienced jurists. Law was a 
function of a particular expertise wielding a closed discourse. Its considerable 
potency inhered precisely in its capacity to seize upon the best available social 
knowledge without diluting its own juristic authority.64 
Even realists inspired by progressive state-building, though they would 
disdain Pound as conservative and timid, held on to the idea of law’s 
distinctiveness. As much as they migrated toward strategies endowing the state 
with distinct forms of regulatory capacity, they identified courts as crucial agencies 
“of social integration and social reform.”65 Realism itself was split over the 
influence to accord social science. In the state, it is true, the era of 
 
61. Pound, supra note 10, at 22, 25. 
62. Id. at 35–36. 
63. Id. at 36. 
64. WILLRICH, supra note 58, at 315–17. See generally ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA 
OF AMERICAN LAW (1938). 
65. Daniel R. Ernst, Law and American Political Development, 1877–1938, 26 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 
205, 213 (1998). 
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“Progressivism,” and particularly the later era of the New Deal, seemed ideal 
environments in which broadly conceived strategies of social inquiry, allied with 
legal-administrative regulatory processes, might provide a platform for 
fundamental departures in social organization. Robert S. Lynd, for example, wrote 
in 1935 of the opportunity “to open up wide, at this time of national re-appraisal, 
the question as to how modern democratic government may best function in 
relation to . . . a socially guided economy.”66 But Lynd wrote as a hopeful 
sociologist, not a lawyer. The legal mandarinate trained in elite schools who 
entered the federal government’s new administrative agencies proved quite 
capable of confining embodiments and modalities of state purpose that competed 
with the fundamental authority of law. 
Some did try to blur the juridical field’s boundaries. The attempts were 
clearest in legal scholarship and education. Felix Cohen, for example, dedicated his 
“functional approach” to “cleansing legal rules, concepts, and institutions of the 
compulsive flavors of legal logic or metaphysics” by bathing them in positivist 
sciences of social events.67 Indeed, Cohen’s goal was not simply to blur the 
distinction between law and social science but to transcend it by moving beyond 
positivism’s “clear, objective” descriptions to an independent appraisal of the law 
and legal institutions it revealed by reference to a distinct “critical” theory of social 
values. “It is through the union of objective legal science and a critical theory of 
social values that our understanding of the human significance of law will be 
enriched.”68 But pedagogical innovation never succeeded in creating the 
conditions for Cohen’s ultimate move. At neither of realism’s twin bastions—
Columbia in the 1920s, Yale in the 1930s—did reorganizations of law instruction 
and legal research according to “functional” criteria ever move beyond Cohen’s 
first step—the attempt to relate legal principles to factual situations parsed by 
resort to positivist social science. Nor, in either case, was even that first step 
sustained for very long. At Columbia the core group of realists abandoned the law 
school in 1928 in the face of mounting opposition to their attempts to bring social 
science to bear on law. At Yale, likewise, law and “empirical” research and 
instruction failed to mesh. By the end of the 1930s legal education at Yale had 
reverted to “entirely standard exercises in case law.”69 
Overall, the transforming conjunction of law and social science for which 
realism had appeared to stand did not take hold. In the vast majority of law 
schools the disciplines were simply too remote from the essential institutional 
imperatives of legal education and training. And realism itself, for all its liberal 
 
66. Christopher L. Tomlins, The New Deal, Collective Bargaining, and the Triumph of Industrial 
Pluralism, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 19, 27 (1985) (quoting Robert S. Lynd). 
67. Cohen, supra note 11, at 847. 
68. Id. at 847, 849. 
69. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 147 (1995); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 117 (1986). 
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advocacy of social change, remained focused primarily on the possibilities for a 
peculiarly legal liberalism.70  
C. Insufficiency 
If revelation stands for the genteel empiricism of law’s antebellum 
epistemology, and production for the successful reconfiguration of law in the form 
of a deliberative and technocratic juridical field, insufficiency stands for the struggles, 
from the 1940s onward, to maintain the juridical field’s configuration in the face 
of growing challenges. 
Legal realism’s efforts to reform legal education during the 1920s and 1930s 
were, in retrospect, its most significant achievement. They underline the capacity 
in American legal education and scholarship to recognize moments of “slippage” 
in law’s status and influence and to respond, as had Langdell (and Pound), by 
innovating. But realism’s particular curricular innovations lacked staying power. 
Nor did they have anything like the national impact of the Langdellian model so 
thoroughly disseminated only a generation previously. Once the law schools had 
completed their replacement of office apprenticeship as the effective point of 
production, early in the twentieth century, the goal in legal education became a 
general raising of standards of entrance, instruction, performance, and output. 
“[F]or most schools outside the narrow elite, these were years when changes or 
innovations in curriculum and teaching methods paled into insignificance when 
compared with the energy needed to cope with the national efforts to ‘raise 
standards.’” By the 1940s “standardized” schools were becoming the norm in the 
law-teaching world at large, designed to train a homogeneous profession in a 
single career.71  
It is at this point that the phase of production in the juridical field’s 
development is succeeded by that of insufficiency. Insufficiency stands, first, for 
the perceived inadequacy of law teaching in providing a generalized education 
appropriate for anything but law practice. Second, it stands for law’s inability, 
despite its ascendancy during the postwar period, to develop a robust capacity for 
intellectual self-explanation beyond internalist doctrinalism and vapid normativity. 
The result was a sense of crisis in the process of production of state elites, and a 
much more extensive turn to social science expertise in the 1950s and 1960s, 
sparking new struggles to sustain the hegemony of law that have continued into 
the twenty-first century. 
 
70. Realism “left much of law’s symbolism intact . . . . [L]egal realism is lawyer’s law.” In that 
form it has become orthodoxy—“the self conception of legal professionals.” John Brigham & 
Christine Harrington, Realism and its Consequences: An Inquiry into Contemporary Sociological Research, 17 
INT. J. SOC. L. 41, 44 (1989). See also Charles W. McCurdy, The Liberty of Contract Regime in American 
Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 161–97 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998); Edward S. 
Robinson, Law—An Unscientific Science, 44 YALE L.J. 235 (1934–35). 
71. STEVENS, supra note 56, at 209–10. 
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The standardized law school provided no education capable of equipping 
lawyers with the capacity to govern the state. With perhaps the exception of the 
most elite eastern schools, post-World War II American law schools did not 
confer upon their graduates the equivalent of Oxford “Greats” or the French 
Grandes Ecôles—the essential mandarin qualification for state elites. Law had 
prevailed in the modern regulatory state created by the New Deal and war. But in 
the state’s Cold War configuration, social science once more became a potent rival 
tool of state service. Indeed, by the 1960s, state sponsorship of social science as a 
policy resource encouraged the development of systematic study of law as a social 
and material phenomenon, to the point where wholly new sites for law study were 
developing beyond the existing boundaries of the juridical field.72  
Successively, policy science, process jurisprudence, Law & Society, and 
Critical Legal Studies—accompanied throughout by continuous development in 
Law & Economics—articulated alternative sites for encounters between law and 
developing public and private demand for trained technocratic elites. Each was 
influenced, in one form or another, by the earlier realist interest in the conjunction 
between law and social science. Each might also be termed a “constructed” site, in 
that the disciplinary encounter was deliberately planned and created rather than—
as in the case of realism—its advantages generally invoked but only haphazardly 
realized. In the 1960s, for example, the Russell Sage Foundation systematically 
underwrote attempts to create disciplinary interaction between law and social 
science by funding four university centers—at Berkeley (1960), Wisconsin (1962), 
Denver (1964), and Northwestern (1964)—and by sponsoring the establishment 
of the Law and Society Association and the Law and Society Review. These moves 
ensured that an apparatus of institutions appeared to sustain Law & Society as a 
field of study and expertise outside the juridical field.73  
The emergence of Law & Society beyond the networks of the law school, the 
investment in it of public and private money, and the involvement of scholars 
whose research and careers were located not in law but in the social sciences 
(notably sociology and political science) in positions of institutional leadership all 
underscore the considerable potential represented in the Law & Society idea for 
radical innovation in the definition of juridical expertise. Having established its 
distinct scholarly locale, however, Law & Society followed a trajectory that fell 
back into, and was thus limited by, a legal orbit. Rather than blurring and 
ultimately transcending disciplinary boundaries in the fashion Felix Cohen had 
advocated, Law & Society (as its prototypically conjunctive self-description, “law 
 
72. Leon Lipson and Stanton Wheeler, Introduction to LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 3–5 
(Leon Lipson and Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986). 
73. Bryant Garth and Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and Society: Reshaping Law for the 
Last Stages of the Social Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 409, 41755 (1998); Felice J. Levine, “His” 
and “Her” Story: The Life and Future of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 69, 7375 
(1990); SCHLEGEL, supra note 69, at 23851.  
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and . . .” suggests) remained stuck at the “pre-critical” first step of the functional 
approach, in which the objective was to explain distinctively “legal” outcomes by 
locating law in explanatory social and economic contexts. As a domain of 
knowledge, that is, Law & Society was focused on explaining the legal. David 
Trubek has explained how its law-centeredness accounts for both Law & Society’s 
successes and its failures.  
 
[F]rom the beginning, the interests of the legal academy strongly 
influenced the law and society idea. While the law and society movement 
succeeded in creating a new object of study and a new domain of 
knowledge, it did so within a ‘legally-constructed’ domain. Thus, law and 
society knowledge, while different from the traditional knowledges 
produced in the legal academy, necessarily reflects the needs and interests 
of legal elites.74  
 
Notwithstanding Law & Society’s location at a remove from the juridical field, its 
characteristic law-centeredness gave the juridical field’s institutions control over 
the flow of socio-legal knowledge into the realms of state and social decision-
making. As Willard Hurst had put it in the mid-1950s, “Lawyers continue to be a 
key policy-making and high policy-executing group in our society; the law schools 
are, therefore, one of the truly strategic points for moving social science 
knowledge, and philosophy about society into the currents of decision in the 
community.”75  
So powerful was the gravitational pull of the juridical field that even the most 
radical of the postwar sites of disciplinary encounter, Critical Legal Studies (CLS), 
would find it impossible to escape its orbit. Politically left wing, CLS originated as 
a critical reaction to Law & Society, particularly to its dominant research practice, 
the ascription of objective meaning through empiricist social scientific inquiry. But 
though determined, like Felix Cohen, to blur the law/society divide and ultimately 
transcend it altogether through resort to critical theory, Critical Legal Studies too 
would end up instead casting itself primarily in law-centric terms. 
Part of the explanation is institutional: CLS was, far more than Law & 
Society, a phenomenon of the legal academy, founded and largely led by legal 
scholars trained and in many cases based at elite law schools.76 But the explanation 
 
74. David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 
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is also intellectual. CLS’s critique of Law & Society scholarship was in large part 
aimed at the latter’s excessive reflexivity. In 1985, for example, Robert Gordon 
could be found writing of CLS’s prevailing understanding that law’s “norms, rules, 
procedures, reasoning processes, etc. have an autonomous content, have an 
independent influence upon the actions of legal officials and ordinary persons in 
society” and that legal ideas “are immensely powerful influences in the formation 
of social purposes and in the ways such purposes are acted upon.”77 No less 
important was CLS’s emphatic denial of the core assumption upon which Law & 
Society’s field of encounter between social science and law had been founded in 
the first place; namely, that resort to social science to undertake empirical mapping 
of “exogenous forces” would produce systematic and objective results. In the 
mature CLS project of the 1980s, law’s virtual autonomy as institutional 
formation, profession, discipline, and discourse became established as the point of 
departure, and internal critique the strategy. Hence, while CLS aspired to 
transcend the law/society distinction, what it in fact achieved was more a reversal 
of social science’s received causal polarities. In the functionalist tradition, “the 
fundamental operations of th[e] world originate before law and go forward 
independently of it; they fashion in general outline (if not in tiny detail) the 
agendas and limits of legal systems and are beyond the power of law to alter.”78 
CLS produced the opposite: “the notion of the fundamentally constitutive 
character of legal relations in social life.”79 Indeed, it produced the claim that law 
was constitutive not merely of social life but of all life. For law was constitutive of 
consciousness itself—of human imagination in all its artifactitious potency.80  
The rise of CLS and its centrality in the juridical field’s intellectual debates 
throughout the 1980s confirmed that the field’s center of gravity lay with the 
institutions from whose network Law & Society at its inception had attempted to 
depart. It is perhaps surprising that such an avowedly radical and transformative 
politics of law as Critical Legal Studies would find itself following an agenda 
largely reflective of the internal doctrinal preoccupations of law and law schools, 
an outcome that, by the mid-1990s, had apparently run CLS out of steam and out 
of influence.81 One explanation is provided simply by adapting Trubek’s 
 
77. Robert W. Gordon, “Of Law and the River,” and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 1, 14 (1985). See G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated 
Intellectual History, 40 SW. L.J. 819, 835 (1986), for his observation that the work of the most notable of 
the early CLS scholars—Horwitz, Kennedy, Unger and Tushnet—was “qualitative and even 
doctrinal” in methodology, and emphasized interest in “legal doctrine, legal consciousness, and the 
ideological structures in which legal rules were embedded.” 
78. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 103 (1984). 
79. Id. at 104. 
80. The contrast between CLS and Law & Economics on this point is marked. It was the 
most zealous proselytizer of the latter who would announce “the decline of law as an autonomous 
discipline.” See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
761 (1987). 
81. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT 
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observations on the fate of Law & Society to include CLS. Far more than Law & 
Society, we have seen, Critical Legal Studies was configured within “a ‘legally-
constructed’ domain.” From the beginning of its formation in the half century 
after 1870, the modern juridical field had pursued institutional and discursive 
innovation in scholarship, teaching, and professional practices whenever law 
appeared to be losing intellectual authority or strategic state influence. CLS 
knowledge, although obviously “different from the traditional knowledges 
produced in the legal academy,” was created in accordance with the field’s terms 
for innovation, and hence, one might conclude, necessarily “reflects the needs and 
interests of legal elites” in maintaining law’s resilience.82 
A different explanation would grant CLS’s law-centeredness an independent 
rationality and would allow CLS its initial radical integrity. Bryant Garth and Joyce 
Sterling have argued that Law & Society’s move back to law following its 
development as a spatially distinct endeavor signifies law’s success in 
reestablishing itself as a discourse of state expertise and governance after a period 
of uncertainty in which other expertises—sociology, political science—
demonstrated their capacity to compete with it to guide state projects. “Law as the 
traditional language of the state appeared to be falling behind in the competition 
to define social problems and produce legitimate solutions.”83 But, as in the past, 
law regrouped, appropriated the social science that it needed, and reaffirmed its 
ascendancy in the state. We might then acknowledge CLS as a radical critique 
developed within law and professing a transformative legal politics that 
confronted resurgent law on its own ground and sought to redirect its ascendancy 
along different paths.84 
 
CENTURY’S END 12526 (1995). 
82. Trubek, supra note 74, at 8. Although at first sight this might seem far-fetched, Minda 
provides a telling commentary on how non-mainstream legal knowledges can serve the elite 
ideological purpose of maintaining law’s resilience:  
It is a critical time for jurisprudential studies in America. It is a time for self-reflection and 
reevaluation of methodological and theoretical legacies in the law. At stake is not only the 
status of modern jurisprudence, but also the validity of the Rule of Law itself. In the 
current era of academic diversity and disagreement, the time has come to seriously 
consider the transformative changes now unfolding in American legal thought. The 
challenge for the next century will certainly involve new ways of understanding how the 
legal system can preserve the authority of the Rule of Law while responding to the 
different perspectives and interests of multicultural communities. . . . The proliferation of 
new forms of competing jurisprudential discourses, the willingness of some to try new 
methods, and the expression of discontent and resistance signify the end of neither 
professional discourse nor law as we have known it—all may simply be symptomatic of 
change from the old to the new.  
Id. at 25657. 
83. Garth and Sterling, supra note 73, at 456. 
84. This is one of Robert Gordon’s strongest themes in his debate with Paul Carrington over 
the meaning of CLS. See Gordon, supra note 77, at 19, 1316. 
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D. Conclusion to Part One 
Writing the history of the juridical field shows us both why “[l]aw in the 
United States historically has been able . . . to gain the position of setting the key 
terms of legitimacy,”85 and how. Culturally and politically, law has occupied a 
position of advantage in discussions over the substance of rules compared with 
other modalities and ideologies of action. It has solidified that position of 
advantage in a structure of national legal practices—discursive, institutional, and 
organizational—that continuously and actively reinforce the United States’ inertial 
political-cultural tendency toward the ascendancy of law in rule production.  
In noting that the history of the juridical field has been very much a history 
of the management of encounters between law and other disciplines, however, we 
can also see that the history of law, at least in the twentieth century, has been a 
history of law’s difficulties when it comes to the necessities of adequate self-
explanation. Debates over the appropriateness, terms, and likely outcomes of rules 
occur in two realms, not one: the realm of law as a locale of rule production, and 
the realm of law as a locale of juristic and scholarly explanation, or legitimation, of 
the form and expression of rule production. 
A 1997 article by Edward Rubin assists in illustrating the relationship 
between these two realms.86 According to Rubin, in the realm of rule production, 
law-trained state decision makers are fully possessed of a distinctive methodology 
and practice that render their activities “epistemologically coherent.”87 Law-trained 
scholars seek to improve the quality of these activities through prescriptive 
intervention “according to the scholar’s own views about law or public policy.”88 
They “instruct[ ]  judges.”89 They articulate arguments that conceivably can affect 
decision making. They are, that is, “inevitably and intensely involved with the 
subject matter of their research.”90 In this incarnation, legal scholarship is not a 
descriptive or a critical, but a prescriptive practice. Legal scholars “are not trying 
to describe the causes of observed phenomena, but to evaluate a series of events, 
to express values, and to prescribe alternatives.”91 They are actively participating in 
the production of rules. In this realm law is a discipline sufficient unto itself. It 
grants a role to other disciplines only insofar as they service its primacy.92 
 
85. Dezalay and Garth, supra note 28, at 307. 
86. Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 521 (1997). 
87. Id. at 541. 
88. Id. at 525. 
89. Id. at 529. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 527. 
92. In Bourdieu’s analysis,  
[P]ractices within the legal universe are strongly patterned by tradition, education and the 
daily experience of legal custom and professional usage. They operate as learned yet deep 
structures of behavior within the juridical field—as . . . habitus. They are significantly 
unlike the practices of any other social universe. And they are specific to the juridical field; 
they do not derive in any substantial way from the practices which structure other social 
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In the realm of legitimation, however, law seeks the aid of other disciplines 
“in characterizing various interactions between law and external phenomena.”93 
No more here than in the process of rule production does law propose to yield to 
the disciplines, for “the prescriptive stance of law is not only an effort to influence 
public decision-makers” but is also itself “a mode of understanding.”94 But that 
mode of understanding is quite insufficient when it comes to coping with 
“reality,” with the “intense relationships” between law and the “external forces . . . 
[and] events” to which legal scholars must react, or with “the effects on such 
events that their recommendations to legal decision makers will produce.”95 A 
self-referential, internally generated legal discourse might be entirely sufficient for 
legal scholars to communicate with judges or practitioners, but not if rules are to 
be explained and their legitimacy confirmed to other decision-makers (legislators, 
administrators) and to wider audiences—notably public opinion and the interests 
to which public opinion responds. Even as it “must continue to develop its own 
methodology for framing its characteristic prescriptions to legal decision-makers,” 
legal scholarship “must rely on other disciplines to characterize external events 
and effects.”96 Here, in what Rubin denotes as “structured debate about social 
norms,” is where social science properly appears, not to resolve issues of “proper 
choice of purpose,” but to inform them and explain them.97 In this field of 
encounter, the disciplines are drawn in to play an essential (though still 
subordinate) role in rule production. 
By distinguishing law’s self-sufficiency as a modality of deployment of power 
and authority from its inadequacy as a modality of explanation and legitimation of 
the results, we can see that law has been more receptive to encounters with 
disciplines in which law’s terms are accepted and its capacity to explain or refine 
or legitimate its performance in rulemaking interactions with external phenomena 
improved, than to encounters in which the disciplines attempt to intrude upon 
law’s terms for deployment of determinative power and authority over rulemaking. 
The question that faces an “interdisciplinary” law school, therefore, is whether to 
enable law’s future disciplinary encounters simply to reproduce this pattern, or 
instead to permit the disciplines to probe law’s “rules for the production of the 
rules” and systematically unpack the structure of national legal practices that 
supports them. Without answering this question at this point, let us now proceed 
 
activities or realms. Thus, they cannot be understood as simple ‘reflections’ of relations in 
these other realms. They have a life, and a profound influence, of their own. Central to 
that influence is the power to determine in part what and how the law will decide in any 
specific instance, case, or conflict. 
Richard Terdiman, Introduction to Bourdieu, supra note 26, at 807. 
93. Rubin, supra note 86, at 541. 
94. Id. at 546. 
95. Id. at 543, 550. 
96. Id. at 553. 
97. Id. at 555. 
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to examine how one discipline in particular—history—has fared in its encounters 
with law. 
II. HISTORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 
Descriptions of recent research in legal history as the work that “may well be 
the most exciting . . . currently being done on law,”98 and of virtually all modern 
history as “critical” when brought into conjunction with the realm of law,99 might 
encourage one to believe that of all the disciplines disposed to probe the juridical 
field, none has greater capacity to bring about a dramatic exposure of “the rules 
for the production of the rules”100 than history. The specific claims require 
examination.101 But so does the general record of history’s disciplinary encounter 
with law. Though there are clear grounds for belief in the critical potential of 
history, the history of legal history suggests that critique has not been uppermost 
in the field’s twentieth-century agenda.  
A. What History Is 
Some 140 years ago, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote an “untimely meditation” on 
the relationship between consciousness of the past and what it means to be 
human. “Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by: they do not know what 
is meant by yesterday or today, they leap about, eat, rest, digest, leap about again, 
and so from morn till night and from day to day, fettered to the moment and its 
pleasure or displeasure, and thus neither melancholy or bored.”102 Nietzsche’s 
cattle lived unhistorically, contained wholly by the present, unaware of any past, 
unaware indeed of anything but the moment. To be human by contrast meant to 
possess an awareness of the historical, and as a consequence, to live a life braced 
“against the great and ever greater pressure of what is past.”103 To be human 
meant, no less, to live in envy of the cattle, to seek relief from the pressure of the 
past by forgetting it, in order to begin to think anew. For history was a “dark, 
invisible burden,” a “consuming fever,” a “mighty . . . movement” that always 
threatened to sweep all before it, against which Nietzsche stood to speak—
”untimely”—of the importance of evading history’s coercive embrace.104  
Forgetting, Nietzsche argued, was essential to action. Yet it was neither 
possible, nor necessarily desirable, wholly to escape the historical. Humanity 
 
98. Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1024 
(1997). 
99. Id. at 1029. 
100. Dezalay and Garth, supra note 28, at 311. 
101. See text accompanying notes 166–219 infra. 
102. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in UNTIMELY 
MEDITATIONS 59–123, 60 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1983). 
103. Id. at 61. 
104. Id. at 59, 60, 61. 
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needed history in order to be human rather than cattle. “The unhistorical and the 
historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a 
people and of a culture.”105 But history was needed to serve specific purposes; not 
the purposes of “the idler in the garden of knowledge,” but purposes that were 
“rough and charmless.” Humanity needed history “for the sake of life and action” 
and for no other reason.106 
B. Lessons of History 
Everyone can claim some sort of relationship to the past. Everyone is 
his/her own historian, by dint of personal awareness of the trivia of life 
circumstance that have produced them as they are, or as they appear to themselves 
to be. Everyone can be some sort of historian also in the larger, necessarily 
collective, sense of associating in acts of remembrance or awareness that evoke 
the past and speculate about its meaning. 
“History” as an evocation of the past is etymologically indistinguishable from 
history as practice or discipline, but the two—history the past and history the 
disciplinary practice—are quite distinct. In 1968, in the introduction to a book on 
the consciousness and practices of a group of American historians eminent in the 
early years of the discipline, Richard Hofstadter observed, “Memory is the thread 
of personal identity, history of public identity.”107 In naming the construction of 
public identity as the job of historical practice, Hofstadter identified the formative 
purpose of the discipline, but also the context that constantly challenges it. For 
history as discipline lives within a broader civic discourse of “history” that, in 
invoking the past, makes its own potent claims to historical awareness and 
knowledge. Indeed, civic discourse crafts “lessons of history” from among the 
totality of acts of evocation of the past, from which—as Nietszche warned—
escape is difficult. 
When invoked to dispense civic lessons, history takes on a purposeful, 
coercive appearance. Take, as an example, an editorial entitled “The Right Side of 
History in Iraq” published in the Chicago Tribune at the height of armed Shi’ite 
opposition led by Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army to the Coalition Provisional 
Authority.108 History, in that editorial, is at once an invisible undertow in human 
affairs, “an unsentimental progression of events,” and a didactic field of force with 
a consciousness all of its own.109 In this particular case, history was “determined 
to leave the insurgents behind.” History would teach even the most intractable 
insurgent the necessity of staying on “the right side of history.” And in teaching 
 
105. Id. at 63. 
106. Id. at 59. 
107. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS: TURNER, BEARD, 
PARRINGTON 3 (1970). 
108. The Right Side of History in Iraq, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2004, §1 at 28. 
109. Id. 
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that lesson “history’s outline begins to grow clear.”110 History, here, is not a 
discipline; it is the elemental power that dictates the course of human affairs, 
against which Nietzsche wrote.111 It is an objective, dispassionate force—
unsentimental ; it has both direction and substance—a progression of events ;  its 
progression is linear, and its linearity embodies movement away—it would leave 
the insurgents behind ;  and its linearity also expresses a guiding consciousness 
capable of moral judgment—it was determined to leave the insurgents behind. By 
recognizing history’s will to progress, and by obeying its directives for action, 
humanity would find itself in a better place, on history’s right side, in conformity 
with its outline. Nonconforming recalcitrants would be left in its wake, behind.112 To 
fail to bow to history is to place oneself in a future outside history—irrelevant, 
invisible, despicable, and disposable. 
Might one claim that this editorial is an illustration of the deployment of 
history to serve “life”? Every trope employed suggests the opposite. When 
Nietzsche wrote his “untimely meditation” he did so precisely to reject such 
totalized representations of human action because they rendered the past inertial, 
the determinant (gravedigger) of the present; because they denied humanity 
plasticity, the capacity for transcendence, “to develop out of oneself in one’s own 
way,” to think and act unhistorically.113 Simultaneously, however, Nietzsche 
recognized the impossibility of avoiding history altogether. The objective was to 
make history serve life. But how? 
C. Archetypes of History  
Nietzsche wrote of the existence of three modalities (social scientists might 
be tempted to call them ideal types) of history—the monumental, the antiquarian, 
and the critical—each of which came complete with its particular liability.114 
History in the monumental mode was history as action in the service of 
greatness—the proud narration of exemplary deeds, of inspiring events, of 
triumph over pettiness. As classic exponents one need think no further than the 
Whig historians of the nineteenth century, like Macaulay and Bancroft, or their 
successors, like Churchill.115 The Chicago Tribune’s Iraq editorial is a convenient 
 
110. Id. 
111. One does not encounter civic leaders enjoining us to place ourselves on “the right side” 
of political science. One does not read of anthropology’s determined judgments in the editorial pages 
of newspapers, or of its outline for mankind. There is no Sociology Channel on cable TV. Economics 
provides perhaps the only close parallel. 
112. For similar attributions of will to history, this time from a professional historian, see 
Hearing on Impeachment Inquiry, Pursuant to H.J. Res. 581, 105th Cong. (1997–1998), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/12/08/transcripts/wilentz.html (last visited July 
16, 2010) (quoting Sean Wilentz, Professor at Princeton University, on the impeachment of President 
William Jefferson Clinton: “[H]istory will track you down and condemn you for your cravenness.”).  
113. NIETZSCHE, supra note 102, at 62. 
114. Id. at 67–77. 
115. See, e.g., THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE 
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exemplar of monumental history in a contemporary setting. The liability of the 
monumental mode, of course, is all that’s omitted: “the past itself suffers harm: 
whole segments of it are forgotten, despised, and flow away in an uninterrupted 
colourless flood, and only individual embellished facts rise out of it like islands.”116 
Monumental history appropriates elements of the past to serve particular current 
or future outcomes. In its course, personalities become exaggerated and deformed; 
narratives become means to indoctrinate; causation is lost in the power attributed 
to the demands of history, to ineffable purposes, to “historical ‘effects in 
themselves.’”117 
History in the antiquarian mode means, superficially, mere collection of past 
facts. Somewhat more subtly it means reverence for what was: the present is but 
the tip of an iceberg of accumulated validity. Put into action—theorized—it 
means history pursued not as appropriation and validation but as continuation and 
reassurance: the Burkean creation of stable identities through seamless connection 
of now to then. But just as the liability of the monumental lies in its overweening 
discrimination, the liability of the antiquarian lies in its inability to discriminate. 
Veneration accords an equal validity to all that is recovered. Committed to stability 
and reassurance, the antiquarian cannot see change or difference that is not in 
accord with its own incrementalist theory of causation.118  
History in critical mode is the antidote to both the monumental and the 
antiquarian. Instead of the past appropriated to the extent that it enables the 
construction of an exemplary guide to particular futures, or revered in its 
wholeness to preserve contemporary life, it is the past interrogated, judged, and 
condemned in order to free life from the oppressive present to which that past 
stands prior. To Nietzsche, critical history might have been a means to throw off 
the suffocating restraint of all pasts: “Every past . . . is worthy to be condemned—
for that is the nature of human things: human violence and weakness have always 
played a mighty role in them.”119 All might be better forgotten. But critical 
history’s purpose was not to enable the past to be ignored; rather it lay in the 
formation of its own kind of remembrance, so that the past that made a particular 
present worthy of destruction might be fully known. This was no exercise in 
inclusion of the innocent, a redress of the grievances of losers, a gathering in of 
“paths not taken”: all were the product of that past; none could dissociate 
themselves from its “aberrations, passions and errors, and . . . crimes.” All being 
implicated, “the best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature 
 
ACCESSION OF JAMES II, 5 vols. (1848); GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, FROM THE DISCOVERY OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT, 10 vols. (1864–75); WINSTON S. 
CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES, 4 vols. (1958–62). 
116. NIETZSCHE, supra note 102, at 71. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 72–75.  
119. Id. at 76. 
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with our knowledge of it, and though a new, stern, discipline combat our inborn 
heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so 
that our first nature withers away.”120 
The recognition of the totality of implication renders critical history as 
tragedy. In the struggle for transcendence, the chance of success is modest. “The 
reconciliations that occur at the end of Tragedy . . . are somber; they are more in 
the nature of resignations of men to the conditions under which they must labor 
in the world.”121 But struggle is the measure of living. It is in this sense that critical 
history serves life. Hence the liability of the critical is the intellectual’s effete 
passivity, ennui, lack of purpose; or worse, irresponsibility; or worst of all, mere 
scholasticism: “instruction without invigoration . . . knowledge not attended by 
action . . . history as a costly superfluity and luxury.”122 
The modalities of nineteenth- and twentieth-century historical practice have 
reproduced the essentials of Nietzsche’s typology. The monumental and the 
antiquarian are the ideal types of modernist historical practice, represented both in 
Whig, Marxist, Progressive, Liberal, and other forms of generalizing, determinist 
or reductionist historical metanarrative that attribute a developmental “direction” 
to history, and in history’s resolute empiricism, its facticity centered on the 
recovery of past events whether unique and serendipitous or recurrent. These 
archetypes are well represented in the contrast between the prototypes of 
modernist historiography: faith in objectivity through abstraction, in the discovery 
of truth through research on the past guided by the future-oriented touchstone of 
human progress; and reliance on systematic empiricism, avoidance of future-
oriented universals or law-like statements, embrace of study of the past “for its 
own sake” and on its own terms.123 
Modernist history’s prototypes have coexisted and interacted within an 
overall appreciation of historical practice as a mode of scientific inquiry, although 
with very different emphases on what “science” means. Modernist metanarrative 
history embraced the language of scientific theorizing in proposing determinist 
laws of historical development to guide empirical investigation of the past. 
Modernist common sense empiricism eschewed law-like scientism but not 
scientific technique: systematicity, trained expertise in discovery and observation 
of archived sources, the metaphor of the laboratory. Antiquarianism is supposedly 
that which professional modernist historical practice defined itself against, yet it is 
what professional historical practice in its early days came closest to reproducing 
(and indeed continues unconsciously to encourage, albeit in ways that are not 
 
120. Id. 
121. HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH 
CENTURY EUROPE 9 (1973). 
122. NIETZSCHE, supra note 102, at 59. 
123. For a critical account of the prototypes of modernist history, see KEITH JENKINS, ON 
“WHAT IS HISTORY?” FROM CARR AND ELTON TO RORTY AND WHITE (1995). 
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consciously “antiquarian”). The initial professionalization of history in late 
nineteenth-century America created a self-referential and internalized disciplinary 
discourse, in which norms of value-neutrality and factualism reigned. The 
standardization of practice assured the interchangeability of the products—“the 
[layed-up] stores of well-sifted materials,” the small groups of facts “properly 
classified and logically dealt with”—that the discipline’s empiricist division of 
labor accumulated.124 James Franklin Jameson wrote in 1910 of the historian as an 
honest artisan fashioning mounds of knowledge-bricks “without much idea of 
how the architects will use them, but believing that the best architect that ever was 
cannot get along without bricks.”125 Edward Cheyney offered a more expansive 
rendition of the same metaphor:  
 
The scientific writer of history . . . builds a classic temple: simple, 
severe, symmetrical in its lines, surrounded by the clear bright 
light of truth, pervaded by the spirit of moderation. Every 
historical fact is a stone hewn from the quarry of past records; it 
must be solid and square and even-hued—an ascertained fact. . . . 
His design already exists, the events have actually occurred, the 
past has really been—his task is to approach as near to the design 
as he possibly can.126 
 
How reassuring it was, that the past should accumulate so cleanly, prove so 
uniformly reproducible, to an inherent design of its own. The aesthetic of 
collective cumulative endeavor survived throughout the twentieth century in 
professional history’s monograph tradition, and its rite of “making a contribution” 
to the accumulation of knowledge.  
D. History in the Juridical Field: The Historical School 
In nineteenth-century Europe, in the German historical school established 
through the intellectual leadership of Friedrich Karl von Savigny, law found its 
first theory of development in just such a modernist scientific conception of 
history. To the historical school, history was a repository of exemplary prior 
instances of action or ideas, but also much more—a “living connection, which 
links the present to the past,” that explained law not as a natural or formal rule 
system but as an embodiment of Volksgeist (spirit of the people) with whose total 
historical development it was “inseparably interwoven.”127 Savigny conceived of 
 
124. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE OBJECTIVITY QUESTION AND THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 55 (1988) (quoting James Franklin Jameson); Id. at 55 (quoting 
Karl Pearson). 
125. Id. (quoting James Franklin Jameson). 
126. Id. (quoting Edward Cheyney). 
127. GEORGE G. IGGERS, THE GERMAN CONCEPTION OF HISTORY: THE NATIONAL 
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law not as something consciously created but as the accumulation “of a people’s 
historical and cultural experience, as a silently growing body, expressing itself in 
the community’s convictions.”128 Savigny’s conception of national legal practices 
as granular instances of Volksgeist was intended to forestall contemporary attempts 
to create law consciously through codification or legislation. In place of legislation, 
Savigny exalted the capacity of jurists, to whom fell responsibility for “the more 
technical parts of law,” whose life’s work it was to trace and render explicit the 
rules immanent in the customs and practices of the Volk, thereby revealing a path 
of “complete undisturbed, national (einheimische) development.”129 Tracing jurists’ 
ideas historically traced the organic development of law. Here was a potent 
example of the “history”-induced inevitability (paralysis) against which Nietzsche 
raged. 
Law’s historical theory of its own development began to circulate in the U.S. 
juridical field in the second half of the century, particularly after the Civil War. In 
important respects—tracing legal evolution through the ideas of jurists, 
emphasizing the determinative authority of jurists over the expression of law in 
rule systems—aspects of German legal science became incorporated in the 
Langdellian transformation of the juridical field. But as a theory of law, “historical 
legal science,” or more generally “historism,”130 fell apart at the end of the 
nineteenth century in the face of law’s own self-reconstitution as an autonomous 
discipline. Insistence on the sufficiency of explanations that simply invoked the 
sheer organic weight of the past were no longer convincing in an era of rapid 
social transformation. Indeed, it was the philosophical disintegration of history in 
its broadly Hegelian, nineteenth-century sense—the unfolding of Spirit in time—
in the face of the critique of Nietzsche and others that helped to constitute the 
first explicitly “critical” approaches to the law/history relationship. The German 
jurist Rudolf von Jhering, for example, rejected the Historical School’s emphasis 
on law’s national spirit and unconscious growth for a “practical jurisprudence” 
that sought to locate law much more explicitly in time and social experience, and 
above all in conscious action and agency.131 Law’s development was not “merely 
the result of unconscious growth, conditioned by innate popular character” and 
hence reducible to a system of concepts designed and manipulated by scholar 
experts. Rather, law lay “in actual social life,” where it was begotten by social 
necessity—“conscious struggles to achieve certain ends through law.”132  
 
TRADITION OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT FROM HERDER TO THE PRESENT 66 (1968). 
128. Matthias W. Reimann, Holmes’s Common Law and German Legal Science, in THE LEGACY OF 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 83 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992). 
129. PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 60, 62 (1980). 
130. Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 1431, 1435 at note 11, 1437–51 (1990) (describing historism as a pervasive “pseudo-scientific” 
consciousness or philosophy of history influencing nineteenth-century social inquiry). 
131. Munroe Smith, Four German Jurists, 10 POL. SCI. Q. 664, 682 (1895). 
132. STEIN, supra note 129, at 66, 67. In DER GEIST DES RÖMICHEN RECHTS (1852– ), 
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For Jhering, such a clear articulation of Nietzsche’s critical modality of 
history would actually be the salvation of history as a means to the development 
of a theory of the law. History would be released from inevitabilist accounts of the 
unfolding of legal development and forced to address uncertainties—change and 
causation.133 “It should not content itself with telling what happened, what 
changes occurred; it should discover the reason, the ‘why,’ of the facts described, 
and the forces that underlie and determine the changes. Nor should legal history 
content itself with this alone: it should show the causal relationship between 
antecedent and subsequent facts, how changes begot other changes.” To do so, 
Jhering argued, legal history had to emancipate itself from law. It should “exist for 
itself, as an independent science.”134  
This did not happen; at least, not in America. In their response to the late 
nineteenth century’s disciplinary reconstitution of knowledge, American historians 
certainly attempted to establish history as an independent science, but they 
eschewed explicit purposiveness as so much “philosophy.” As we have seen, their 
history would be narrowly empirical, a mode of inquiry that would produce 
factualist bricks to an implicit, naturally-occurring design. Most American 
historians abjured any broad architectonic role to the social sciences, notably 
sociology and political science.135 In the juridical field, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
ventured toward the critical Nietzschean standpoint embraced by Jhering, 
identifying history not simply as a means to understand law on its own terms but 
to demystify it, to show that law’s life was revealed by context—“the felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with 
their fellow-men”—not by any self-referential “logic.”136 But Holmes’ skepticism 
would later lead him in a different direction than the experiential, wondering in 
The Path of the Law whether it would not be a gain “if every word of moral 
significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted 
 
quoted in id. at 65, Jhering writes, “Life does not exist for the sake of concepts, but concepts for the 
sake of life. It is not logic that is entitled to exist, but what is claimed by life, by social relations, by the 
sense of justice—and the logical necessity, or logical impossibility, is immaterial.” 
133. Jhering sounds this theme in the opening pages of THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW (John J. 
Lalor trans., Callaghan & Company 2d ed. 1915) (1872), where he writes, at 1–2, that “The life of the 
law is a struggle–a struggle of nations, of the state power, of classes, of individuals. All the law in the 
world has been obtained by strife. . . . The entire life of the law, embraced in one glance, presents us 
with the same spectacle of restless striving and working of a whole nation, afforded by its activity in 
the domain of economic and intellectual production.” 
134. Jhering’s reflections on legal history were contained in one of his last works, a fragment 
on legal historiography published two years after his death as an essay in a collection entitled 
ENTWICKLUNGSGESCHICHTE DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS (1894) [History of the Evolution of the 
Roman Law], and remarked on by Munroe Smith in Four German Jurists. III. Bruns, Windscheid, Jhering, 
Gneist, 12 POL. SCI. Q. 21, 32 (1897). 
135. See generally NOVICK, supra note 124, at 61–108. 
136. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).  
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which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.”137 
Holmes’ modernist skepticism helped to kill the nineteenth century’s historical 
school in the American juridical field, in other words, but unlike Jhering Holmes 
did not point the field toward any new “emancipated” replacement. As a result, 
though legal history continued to be written in the juridical field after the turn of 
the century, it lost the centrality enjoyed by the historical school, becoming a 
fringe activity that tended to normalize whatever law’s current state of affairs 
might be. 
E. Roscoe Pound’s History 
Musing, in the early 1920s, on the historical school’s significance, Roscoe 
Pound characterized its adherents as participants in a general attempt to resolve a 
central problem of nineteenth-century legal thought, the problem of reconciling 
the universalist impulse of the Enlightenment with human circumstance: 
 
[T]he social interest in the general security ha[d] led men to seek some 
fixed basis for an absolute ordering of human action whereby a firm and 
stable social order might be assured. But continual changes in the 
circumstances of social life demand[ed] continual new adjustments to the 
pressure of other social interests as well as to new modes of endangering 
security.138  
 
Nineteenth-century historical jurisprudence had attempted to join stability with 
adjustment in an organic and incrementalist theory of origins and adaptation that 
afforded little room for self-conscious rationalizing interventions.  
 
It did not think of a law which had always been the same but of a law 
which had grown. It sought stability through establishment of principles 
of growth, finding the lines along which growth had proceeded and 
would continue to proceed. . . . Law was not declaratory of morals or of 
the nature of man as a moral entity or reasoning creature. It was 
declaratory of principles of progress discovered by human experience of 
administering justice and of human experience of intercourse in civilized 
society; and these principles were not principles of natural law revealed 
 
137. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897). 
History, Holmes wrote, must be a part of “the rational study of law” for “without it we cannot know 
the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it 
is the first step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the 
worth of those rules” (469). Thereafter, the study of history should be writ small. “I look forward to a 
time when the part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of 
ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the 
reasons for desiring them” (474).  
138. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923). 
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by reason, they were realizings of an idea, unfolding in human experience 
and in the development of institutions—an idea to be demonstrated 
metaphysically and verified by history.139 
 
Pound accepted that historical jurisprudence had been an advance on natural 
law reasoning in its attempts to accommodate social change. But it was flawed by 
its own vulnerability to change. Historical jurisprudence lodged legitimacy in 
custom and recognized that custom could change over time, but controlled 
change by privileging the organic continuity of the Volk, the homogenous people, 
over the “current speculation” that motivated reformers and legislatures. Too 
much change, and historical jurisprudence lost its explanatory capacities; 
heterogeneity thinned the credibility of shared custom. In the U.S. case, the 
influence of historical jurisprudence had waned decisively in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century for precisely this reason. Its ideology of custom in 
common could not cope with the massive transformations of industrialization, 
immigration, and urbanization, with all their attendant demographic dislocations, 
cultural diversifications, class formation, and conflict, or with the new social 
knowledges whose development these changes sharply accelerated. Historical 
jurisprudence was too conservative, too dogmatic, too impervious to anything 
other than the slow grind of organic evolution. “It assumed progress as something 
for which a basis could be found within itself. . . . It assumed that a single causal 
factor was at work in legal history and that some one idea would suffice to give a 
complete account of all legal phenomena.”140 
Like Jhering, thirty years before, Pound called for a new legal history to 
replace the old—“for a sociological legal history, a study of the social effects 
which the doctrines of the law have produced in the past and of how they have 
produced them,” a history that would not “deal with rules and doctrines apart 
from the economic and social history of their time.”141 But Pound’s words proved 
cheap. When some years later he turned to history to expound at length upon the 
course of American law, in his lectures on The Formative Era, Pound completely 
repudiated his earlier interest in a new legal historiography. The hermetically sealed 
“taught legal tradition” he celebrated in his lectures—received from England, 
transmitted through successive generations of lawyers and judges tempered by 
training and practice, resistant to dramatic conflictual change—was, he now 
declared, “much more significant in our legal history than the economic 
conditions of time and place.”142 
Robert Gordon has written that failure “to develop an extensive external 
historiography of law” during the first half of the twentieth century represented “a 
 
139. Id. at 9. 
140. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
141. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 213 (1921). 
142. POUND, supra note 64, at 82–83. 
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loss of nerve” brought about by “an anxious solicitude” for the fate of the U.S. 
juridical field’s common law tradition amid circumstances (wrenching social and 
economic change) that threatened it.143 Pound’s volte-face between 1921 and 1936 
illustrates that loss of nerve, if indeed that is what it was. But there is another way 
to understand Pound’s dismissal of the standpoint—extrinsic causality—he had 
seemed earlier to embrace. Amid the crisis of the New Deal’s administrative law 
revolution, the “taught tradition” put rule production away in a safe preserve, 
under the control of an expertise the construction and transmission of which was 
organized from within the juridical field itself—precisely where Pound had located 
it at the beginning of his career.144 
F. James Willard Hurst’s History 
As the only scholar in the first half of the century to attempt a general 
history of American law, Roscoe Pound became, inevitably, a principal point of 
orientation for those—first Willard Hurst, after him Morton Horwitz—whose 
work would dominate the century’s second half. Judged by the conventions of 
contemporary historical practice, better historians than Pound slowly gathered at 
Columbia, where Charles Beard (Political Science) and James Harvey Robinson 
(History) had earlier presided: Pound’s near contemporary, the acerbic Julius 
Goebel, was joined somewhat later in the law school by Joseph Henry Smith and, 
in the History Department (no doubt to Goebel’s dismay), by Richard B. 
Morris.145 A few others outside the legal academy could also be found engaged in 
historical research on American law, notably John R. Commons in the 1920s, 
Perry Miller much later.146 None was more original than Commons, none more 
 
143. Gordon, supra note 35, at 29.  
144. See text accompanying notes 58–64 supra. See also JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND 
COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 221–34 (2007) (describing Pound’s 
alienation from the New Deal revolution in administrative law). 
145. All are best known for their work in the legal history of the colonial and early national 
periods. For representative work see Goebel’s early essay, King’s Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth 
Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1931), and his much later HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971). Joseph H. 
Smith is best known for his classic APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN 
PLANTATIONS (1950), for THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND 
COMMENTARY (1964), undertaken in collaboration with Goebel, and—also in collaboration with 
Goebel—for the production of numerous volumes of CASES AND MATERIALS on early American law 
and on the development of legal institutions. Morris’s later career was almost entirely taken up with 
the framing of the American Constitution and its subsequent history, but his early career produced 
two books on early American law remembered among legal historians: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURIES (1930), and GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA (1946). Both attracted 
criticism, the latter mainly for its rather indiscriminate empiricism, the former, much more 
spectacularly, for ill-informed intrusions upon matters of law. See Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 31 
COLUM. L. REV. 729 (1931), and infra, text at note 190. 
146. See JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924); PERRY MILLER, 
THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1965). 
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fluent than Miller. Still, in so tiny a field—in 1931 Karl Llewellyn described 
American legal history as “substantially unoccupied” and “near-empt[y]”147—
Pound cast a long shadow. None challenged his “formative era” synthesis before 
Hurst in the 1950s and Horwitz, in very different fashion, in the 1970s. Their 
distinct breakouts twice altered the trajectory of American legal history, decisively 
in Hurst’s case, dramatically in Horwitz’s. 
Hurst had encountered Pound when he was a law student at Harvard in the 
early 1930s; he thought Pound dogmatic and arrogant.148 Influenced by the 
Realism that Pound was increasingly driven to reject, Hurst would set out actually 
to achieve what Pound had done no more than talk about: an externalist sociology 
of juridical action and institutions. Hurst, writes William Novak, stressed the 
“living interplay of law and social growth” and “law’s operational ties to other 
components of social order.” He “strove to underwrite his work with a systematic 
and elaborate conceptual framework designed to link his close empirical 
investigations of nineteenth-century American law to perennial questions about 
‘the general course of social experience.’”149 Indeed, Hurst’s empirical research 
revealed a causality that undermined Pound’s careful discriminations among 
spheres of expertise, and reversed his post-Progressive taught tradition. 
Theorizing law as the expression of social purpose arising concretely from 
struggles among interests, Hurst observed, “[i]n the interaction of law and 
American life the law was passive, acted upon by other social forces, more often 
than acting upon them.”150 This was the first resolutely externalist 
conceptualization of causality in the U.S. field. 
The use of law to further self-interest is, of course, the leitmotiv of Law and 
the Conditions of Freedom, Hurst’s own account of American law’s formative era. Still 
a phenomenon of the first half of the nineteenth century, but otherwise 
 
Commons would later be dismissed by neoclassical economists, just as Miller would be by lawyers. See 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932–1970, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 163 (1983); Lawrence M. Friedman, Heart Against Head: Perry Miller and the Legal Mind, 77 
YALE L.J. 1244 (1968) (book review). Between Commons and Miller one can point to other isolated 
forays into research on legal thought and institutions undertaken by historians much better known for 
other work, such as DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES (1941), and OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, 
COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1774–1861 (1947). 
147. Llewellyn, supra note 145, at 730, 732. In 1993, Willard Hurst observed that it was 
“literally true” that, as of the mid-1930s, “there were probably only three or four practicing legal 
historians in the United States.” Hendrik Hartog, Snakes in Ireland: A Conversation with Willard Hurst, 12 
LAW & HIST. REV. 370, 385 (1994). 
148. Hartog, supra note 147, at 374. 
149. William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James 
Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 99, 100 (2000). 
150. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 4 
(1950). The second sentence of the book reads, “Men wanted national independence largely for 
economic reasons, but they said they wanted it because their legal rights were invaded”(3). 
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completely distinct from Pound’s taught transatlantic common law tradition, 
Hurst’s American law sprouted from rich democratic Midwestern sod, immanent 
in the actions of ordinary citizens who contrived institutions to lend legality to the 
pre-existing facts (settlements) they had created on the ground. For Hurst, 
ordinary Americans—not juridical elites—were makers of law. They did so 
“primarily by action,” hardly pausing to construct any lasting framework “except 
in areas which we saw most directly contributing to the release of private energy 
and the increase of private options.”151 Multiple egotistic struggles to realize self-
interest generated functional socio-legal structures. With constitution-making out 
of the way, “the nineteenth century was prepared to treat law more casually, as an 
instrument to be used wherever it looked as if it would be useful.”152 
Hurst is famous for the instrumentalism immanent in this vision of 
American law. Instrumentalism, however, was but a surface phenomenon. As 
producers of outcomes, the structures it spawned reached no further than the 
short-term calculus that Hurst called “bastard pragmatism.”153 Below 
instrumentalism lay consensus, something altogether different. For Hurst, the 
deep underlying structure of consensus was a necessary condition of his 
jurisprudence of self-interest: social consensus, conscious and conditioned, 
supplied law’s meta-character, allowing interests to fight for relative advantage 
without risking systemic rupture. Consensus mediated the fight.154 
In the prolegomenon to his entire scholarly project, written in the late 1940s, 
Hurst underscored the production and reproduction of consensus as a basic 
function, foundational to the social order. The job was law’s to perform. Political 
argument over the meaning of gain, or its distribution, was no more than a “vent 
for emotion.”155 The real work was done in the juridical field, whose agencies, 
 
151. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 5, 10 (1956). 
152. Id. at 10. See also JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED 
STATES 23–24 (1977). 
153. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY 147 (1972). 
154. Hurst saw consensus (custom) as a condition of law production:  
The most creative, driving, and powerful pressures upon our law emerged from the social 
setting. Social environment has two aspects. First, it is what men think: how they size up 
the universe and their place in it; what things they value, and how much; what they believe 
to be the relations between cause and effect, and the way these ideas affect their notions of 
how to go about getting the things that they value. Second, it is what men do: their habits, 
their institutions. 
HURST, supra note 150, at 11. In Social Science on a Lawyer’s Bookshelf: Willard Hurst’s Law and the 
Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 59, 80–81 (2000), Carl 
Landauer notes that Hurst portrayed the nineteenth century as “a fully articulated cultural structure” 
and “a carefully structured intellectual system in which the parts work perfectly together.” 
Fundamentally, Landauer concludes, “Hurst was describing the working of a value system. ‘The tone 
of this society,’ he stated about early nineteenth-century America, ‘was set by men for whom life’s 
meaning lay in striving, creation, change, and mobility.’ All had ‘the same ‘life goals and values’.” 
155. HURST, supra note 150, at 442. 
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protocols and personnel—legislatures, courts, executive and administrative bodies, 
lawyers—were handed the “ideal function” of “order[ing] social relations . . . 
protect[ing] the individual on the one hand, and the community on the other.”156  
The job for the juridical field, hence, was to be both functional and 
objective—find facts, make policy, and see to its execution “with substantial 
neutrality toward special interests.”157 But the field’s capacities for neutrality were 
hampered by Americans’ preoccupation “with the economy as a field for private 
adventure,” which bred a historic indifference to the creation of efficient public 
institutions and left law open to the influence of special interests.158 The 
supposedly hermetic juridical field of earlier legal historiography was in fact only 
too vulnerable to externalities:  
 
Main currents in the history of all the principal agencies of lawmaking 
showed this in one fashion or another. The late-nineteenth-century 
courts yielded uncritically. . . . The bar fell so far into the governing 
temper of the time as to be content with the role either of technician or 
partisan, and forfeited much of its public standing as spokesman of the 
general interest.159  
 
The legislature showed no more capacity to identify and defend a public interest. 
Only the executive showed any potential. The argument was devastating to 
Pound’s celebratory Formative Era. Hurst could agree that law should perform “as 
mediator of the general interest” but not that it had succeeded in doing so over 
time. History’s job was not to participate in mythmaking but to assess law’s 
performance, “to trace the manner in which legal institutions had dealt with the 
resulting tensions in one field of public policy after another.”160 
One can legitimately identify Hurst’s history as the first systematic attempt to 
write a history of the creation and production of national legal practices.161 Given 
its predecessors, the question is why this history began to come about at this time: 
Why was Hurst successful in influencing legal-historical inquiry to move away 
from complaisant descriptions of “the production of the rules” in the juridical 
field to probe for the circumstances of rule production—the “rules for the 
production of the rules”? And how deeply, in fact, did Hurst’s new history probe? 
The answer is organizational rather than intellectual. Hurst’s genre of legal 
 
156. Id. at 439. 
157. Id. at 443. 
158. Id. at 444. 
159. Id. at 445. 
160. Id. at 446. 
161. In 1956 Hurst identified his project as “a long-term program of research in the history of 
the interplay of law and other social institutions in the growth of the United States.” HURST, supra 
note 151, at vii. 
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history did not become paradigmatic until more than twenty years after Hurst 
began writing, and more than ten years after the circle of those whom he had 
influenced and supported began to produce their own “externalist” historical 
scholarship.162 Paradigm status came about through the exercise of considerable 
entrepreneurial capacities to build his genre, through calculated professional 
choice and strategy, rather than through some spontaneous shift in historical 
imagination. Examining that effort at paradigm construction, moreover, indicates 
that Hurst’s historiography was but one manifestation (and not the most 
important) of a more general critique that served far more than scholarly-analytic 
purposes. History was Hurst’s personal métier and vehicle, but the fundamental 
purpose of Hurst’s activities is better understood if placed outside any framework 
of scholarly ambition for history in law per se. Rather, Hurst’s professional goal, as 
had been Langdell’s (and the young Pound’s), was to stimulate the process of 
writing new rules for the production of rules so as to maintain law’s ascendancy 
within the juridical field.  
To appreciate this, three aspects of Hurst’s effort must be highlighted. Most 
obvious, its location: professionally, Hurst was firmly situated within the juridical 
field, and he wrote for its attention. Second, its position: a half-century’s tenure at 
Wisconsin defined Hurst’s orientation to the juridical field as one decisively 
outside the orbit of the traditional centers of influence in the field—the eastern 
elite schools that had to that point produced the field’s dominant accounts of 
itself. Finally, standpoint: the strategic intellectual stance Hurst espoused was not 
that of history per se but, much more broadly, of “social science”—always, in the 
twentieth century, the disciplinary genre most clearly associated (as history was 
not), with innovation in the juridical field.  
The call for innovation that Hurst answered arose from the combination of 
circumstances charted earlier in this article:163 the failure of legal realism to achieve 
a decisive alteration in legal pedagogy, the resultant complacency in the postwar 
legal profession stemming from the continued narrowness of the training offered 
by traditional centers of influence, and, consequently, the sense of crisis arising 
from the profession’s difficulties in asserting capacities for political leadership in 
the postwar period.164 Added to professional crisis was a perception that the social 
 
162. Mark Tushnet noted in 1972 that, at the time of its publication in 1964, Hurst’s most 
ambitious empirical study (on which he had spent some seventeen years) LAW AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN (1964) “received little 
attention” and, until the early 1970s, had been “largely ignored.” See Mark Tushnet, Lumber and the 
Legal Process, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 114 (1972). Robert Gordon also traces the rise of the Hurstian 
perspective to the early 1970s. Gordon, supra note 35, at 55. Lawrence M. Friedman, probably the 
most important disseminator and exemplar of Hurstian legal history, published the first edition of his 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW in 1973. Harry Scheiber was instrumental in introducing historians at 
large to Hurst’s work at about the same time. See his 1970 review article, At the Borderland of Law and 
Economic History: The Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 744 (1970). 
163. See text accompanying notes 65–75 supra. 
164. Garth, supra note 75, at 38, 54. 
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science disciplines were once more forging ahead (as they had in the 1890s and 
again in the 1920s) in the competition to furnish the key epistemological site for 
authoritative state decision making. Hurst’s answer—his stress on the necessity 
that “empirical research and social science” be brought fully into the juridical 
field—was his answer both to law’s crisis and the social sciences’ challenge. It 
envisaged innovation as a broadening of the juridical field’s capacities through 
reform controlled from within. Like Pound at the turn of the century, Hurst 
sought to renew the legal-academic establishment by appropriating expertise from 
outside. Also like Pound, law was to remain on top.165 
III. CRITICAL LEGAL HISTORY 
Willard Hurst’s campaign to renovate American legal pedagogy was 
successful in both its major aspects: promoting innovation in, while retaining 
initiative for, the juridical field. Socio-legal teaching and research was launched, 
but as we have seen its ambit was successfully contained within a legally 
constructed domain. New rules for the production of rules within the field were 
written, and the prior rule-formation paradigm (the taught tradition) declared 
obsolete. No less an observer than Supreme Court Justice Byron White 
acknowledged the change in 1971, praising the turn in legal research from “narrow 
study of judicial doctrine” to “deal[ing] with the ties between law and society.”166 
White’s comments mark the early 1970s as a pivotal moment for Law & 
Society within the juridical field, but also for the spread of socio-legal history 
beyond it. As an entrepreneur for Law & Society, Hurst had recommended a 
general externalism, and since the early 1960s it had been coming on line.167 But it 
is indisputable that by the early 1970s Hurst’s legal history had also gained an 
appreciative audience among American historians. Symbolically, Hurst was invited 
to write the keynote essay for the volume Law in American History, published in 
1971 by Harvard’s impeccably establishment Charles Warren Center for Studies in 
American History. It is in that volume’s introduction that Justice White can be 
found endorsing Hurst’s “law and society” perspective over “doctrine.”168  
It is noteworthy, then, that it was precisely at this ceremonial moment 
celebrating the triumph of externality throughout the juridical field, and of socio-
legal history’s admission to the canon of “American History,” that we should 
encounter Morton Horwitz, then a young Assistant Professor at Harvard Law 
 
165. In Willard Hurst and the Administrative State: From Williams to Wisconsin, 18 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 1, 14 (2000), Daniel Ernst notes that Hurst “agreed with [Felix] Frankfurter that ‘the expert 
should be on tap, but not on top’—unless that expert was a lawyer.” 
166. Byron R. White, Introduction to LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, vi (Donald Fleming and 
Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).  
167. Richard Posner dates law’s “decline” as an autonomous discipline from the mid-1960s. 
See Posner, supra note 80, at 761. 
168. White, supra note 166. 
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School, entering upon a new and distinct struggle to define the proper ambit for 
legal studies, one that named not society but legal doctrine—the real meaning of 
the rules—as the essential terrain.169 Like Hurst, Horwitz embraced a standpoint 
wider than history per se, being a prime mover in the Critical Legal Studies 
movement. Also like Hurst, Horwitz’s preferred métier was legal history. Thereafter 
their sensibilities parted company. 
In America, Horwitz observed quite appropriately, legal history had been 
written almost exclusively by lawyers. Horwitz speculated that scholars from 
outside the juridical field had absented themselves because writing legal history 
“inevitably involves mastery of technical legal doctrine,” which always left the 
outsider “paralyzed with fear.”170 But what kept historians untutored in law from 
writing legal history did not really interest Horwitz; like all the law-trained legal 
historians before him, Horwitz was writing to gain attention within the juridical 
field. His particular objective was to expose the reality of what his predecessors 
had created—a history of continuities and intact traditions and doctrinal 
necessities, all of which was “to pervert the real function of history by reducing it 
to the pathetic role of justifying the world as it is”—and to overthrow it.171 
Horwitz’s target here was Roscoe Pound’s celebration of law’s internalized 
constancy under the tutelage of heroic judges and sympathetic legal intellectuals. 
He spoke out for “the real function of history”—corrosive critique—against 
Pound’s “dominant form of legal history.”172 Pound’s form, of course, was no 
longer dominant. Had not Hurst and his acolytes been pounding Pound for more 
than twenty years? Yet Horwitz was no less critical of Hurst’s approach, as his 
immensely influential Transformation of American Law (1977) would demonstrate. 
Hurst measured outcomes by process—how effectively the goals of a 
presumptively shared national consciousness and national purpose were realized. 
But social process did not acknowledge social struggle. Asymmetric distributions of 
wealth and power left Horwitz skeptical of histories that could represent legal 
innovations as instrumental responses to consensual “social needs.” The 
disproportionate accrual of benefits to entrepreneurial and commercial groups 
during the “formative era” signified that legal action was guided by conscious 
politics of “expropriation of wealth,” of “subsidies to growth” coerced from 
others. Once redistribution had been achieved, the dynamic legal innovation that 
had achieved it was replaced by “a scientific, objective, professional and apolitical 
conception of law,” late nineteenth-century formalism, which camouflaged law’s 
“political and redistributive functions.”173 
 
169. Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973). 
170. Id. at 275. 
171. Id. at 281. 
172. Id. at 278, 283. 
173. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860, at xvi, 
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Horwitz’s assault on lawyers’ perversions of history was the first in a line of 
more elaborated analyses that would coalesce in the early 1980s as “Critical Legal 
History” (CLH), the most productive and sustained expression of Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS). Written largely from within the elite eastern establishment that 
Hurst had targeted, the defining characteristic of the genre would be its rejection 
of Hurst’s externalism, its preoccupation with doctrine in particular, and the law’s 
internalities in general.174 
As it developed over the decade following Horwitz’s assault on “the 
conservative tradition,” CLH’s form and expression evolved. Initially, its 
adherents identified CLH as a socio-legal genre, albeit with a “new left” bite. 
Much as Hurst’s earliest thoughts on legal history had been influenced by reading 
Charles and Mary Beard, CLH flirted with the English radical historians, E.P. 
Thompson and Douglas Hay. Its earliest manifestations demonstrated some 
affinity with Nietzsche’s sense of the critical—fighting with the present’s 
structures of authorization and limitation through remembrance of the past of 
suffering and violence that underwrites it; and simultaneously recognizing that 
those structures were very deeply embedded and very difficult to alter. It was 
obvious, wrote the genre’s leading historiographer, Robert Gordon, in the first 
comprehensive statement theorizing CLH, published in 1982, that there exist 
“many constraints on human social activity—scarcities of desired things, finite 
resources of bodies and minds, production possibilities of existing and perhaps all 
future technologies, perhaps even ineradicable propensities for evil—that any 
society will have to face.”175 What Gordon wanted to emphasize, however, was 
that material conditions did not of themselves dictate a specific set of social 
arrangements “in history or in our own time.”176 And he wanted to show that this 
realization could be beneficial to political action. Recognition that there were no 
objective laws of social change operating automatically in closed causal systems 
independent of, or despite, human imagination, was at one level, Gordon noted, 
deeply depressing, one might say tragic. It meant that history, as the Tribune’s 
cliché had it, was not on “our” side. But it was also liberating, for it led on to the 
conclusion that history was not on any side, and that “the real enemy”—and 
hence solution—“is us . . . the structures we carry around in our heads, the limits 
on our imagination.” Change was difficult. People had to “break out of their 
accustomed ways.” This was rare. Success was rarer. Nevertheless the point was to 
stress the underdetermination of material constraints visible in “concrete histories 
of particular societies” in order to relocate the potential for social change in “our” 
 
266 (1977). 
174. The trend was given decisive definition, meaning, and a name in Robert W. Gordon’s 
famous 1984 article, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 78. 
175. Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 291 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
176. Id. 
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recognition of our own responsibility for the way things were.177 By the early 
1980s, in other words, CLH had given up on Horwitz’s attempt in Transformation 
to show that determinable relationships existed in historical time between legal 
doctrines and asymmetric socio-economic outcomes. Critical legal historians 
continued to accept Horwitz’s emphasis on the intellectual history of legal 
doctrine, but switched to “subversive” exposure of the politics of legal knowledge. 
The objective became not to reveal law’s implication in particular social and 
economic outcomes but rather its plasticity and indeterminacy. 
So far so good. People had a capacity to act; the trick was first to make them 
aware of it, and then persuade them of the necessity. Critical legal historians made 
the study of “legal consciousness” their point of entry. But as they did so, CLH 
became less and less concerned with the consciousness of masses—the field-level 
socio-legal domain—and more and more caught up in investigation of the legal 
consciousness of elites and the constructions of formal mandarin legality. As 
Horwitz’s reversion to doctrine at the very outset of the CLS era suggested, CLH’s 
reason for being lay in the realm of struggles within the juridical field over the 
meaning of the rules that the field produced.178 Excavating doctrine—“taking 
dominant legal ideologies at their own estimation and trying to see how their 
components are assembled”—was more exciting, and more important to the CLS 
project, than reporting on “the grimy details” of how ruling classes attained and 
used power.179 Amid the excitement, Gordon had noted that “we’ll never 
understand the power that legal forms hold over our minds unless we see them at 
work up close in the most ordinary settings.”180 Nevertheless, grime would get the 
shorter shrift.  
The choice of focus was important. Hurst’s socio-legal paradigm had been 
responsible for sparking the first sustained efforts at professional historical 
research on law; it would remain highly influential among the growing numbers of 
scholars who for the first time were being trained in legal history as historians.181 
 
177. Id. at 290, 291. 
178. See text accompanying notes 76–84 supra. 
179. Robert W. Gordon, The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and Destabilizing 
Functions of History in Legal Argument, in THE HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 360 (Terence 
J. McDonald ed., 1996). 
180. Gordon, supra note 78, at 124. 
181. See, e.g., ARTHUR F. MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN’S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN 
THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850–1980 (1986); VICTORIA SAKER WOESTE, THE FARMER’S 
BENEVOLENT TRUST: LAW AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1865–
1945 (1998). Students of Morton Keller have tended to show a critical appreciation for Hurst while 
taking a greater interest in developing a legal history more oriented to questions of governance and 
state capacities, consonant with Keller’s interests. See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE 
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985); HENDRIK HARTOG, 
PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN 
AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870 (1983); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND 
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
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“The Horwitz thesis,” as Transformation’s argument came to be known, was equally 
influential among historians. Legal scholars would spend years excoriating the 
book. John Phillip Reid of New York University School of Law, for example, 
denounced Horwitz as a “conspiratorial materialis[t],” and called upon the legal 
academy to rally to protect the gullible from the seductive manipulations of 
iconoclasts intent on sacking “the temple of legal history.”182 Historians treated 
Transformation with considerably greater respect, awarding it the 1978 Bancroft 
Prize. Most dwelt less on the “complex and technical” details of its argument than 
on its account of law’s socio-economic effects, which enabled them to assimilate 
Transformation to the now well-established socio-legal paradigm. Not many 
historians would follow CLH’s subsequent turn away from what Robert Gordon 
would term “evolutionary functionalism” (a breathtakingly wide category in which 
Gordon included literally every form of social-historical theorizing, from Marx 
and Weber to Hurst, and also Horwitz prior to CLS) to the indeterminacy 
thesis.183 These remained largely a preoccupation of law-based academics. 
The more CLH favored the mandarin domain of doctrinal disputation, the 
more its exponents found reason to depart from their early recognition of the 
durability of “accustomed ways” in favor of representations of structures of 
thought as ever more plastic, contradictory, contested, and plural. Deconstruction 
of doctrine taught that there were no “necessary consequences of the adoption of 
[any] given regime of rules.”184 As Gordon put it, “if the legal rules and processes 
that in part constitute the workings of a liberal-capitalist society are contradictory 
at the core, there must always be alternative arrangements—already built in, as it 
were—to those that a society at any given time happens to privilege.”185 By the 
mid-1990s, CLH had produced so indeterminate a world that—to restate 
Gordon’s words—privilege had become a matter of happenstance. In its maturity, 
that is, CLH moved to examine the rules for the production of the rules, only to 
conclude that there were none.  
To CLS/CLH, indeterminacy was a move in an intellectual-analytic game. 
Springing from an initial confrontation with instrumentalism, indeterminacy 
confronted and undermined dogma. Indeterminacy rendered structures 
perpetually malleable, legal traditions perpetually multiple. Every form of legality, 
and every historical statement, became a constructed artifact. By turning critical 
history into a field of play, however, critical legal historians risked turning their 
practice into the realization of critical history’s preeminent liability—
purposelessness, irresponsibility, scholasticism. There is, to use Francis Barker’s 
word, a fundamental “impertinence” in the elite intellectual’s account of the 
liberating promise of contingency and indeterminacy, the call to recognize 
 
182. John Phillip Reid, A Plot Too Doctrinaire, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1321 (1977).  
183. Gordon, supra note 78, at 59–102. 
184. Id. at 101, 125; see also Gordon, supra note 179, at 358–63. 
185. Gordon, supra note 179, at 361–62. 
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opportunity in plasticity, that undermines its moral integrity. The vast majority of 
the world needs no instruction in indeterminacy. Its “normal experience . . . has 
been for centuries that of unstable turbulent uncertainty.”186 This is an uncertainty 
inflicted not desired, to be escaped not sought. 
The intellectual’s claim that plasticity is to be embraced as liberation, rather 
than feared as simply another effect of power, does not accord with any sensible 
understanding of the current conjuncture. Gordon, to his great credit, eventually 
recognized the problem. “The notion that every form of legality [indeed of 
consciousness] is a constructed artifact . . . tends . . . to deprive people of any 
strong basis for confidence in transcendent standpoints for critique of the present 
order.”187 But in 1995, at least, he had no answer. Critical Legal History was at a 
dead end. 
A. Critical Historicism 
In the later 1990s the impasse besetting CLH seemed temporarily to abate as 
Robert Gordon announced (somewhat in the manner of a preacher at a revival 
meeting) the arrival of a new iteration of the genre, “critical historicism.” 
Proclaiming its products perhaps “the most exciting work currently being done on 
law,”188 Gordon underlined the sense of occasion by resort to a rather exotic 
metaphor. The arrival of critical historicism represented nothing less than the 
presentation of credentials by “an accredited envoy from Other Genres to the City 
of Law,” and recognition of the envoy “as a category of intellectual practice 
relevant to law.”189 
As Gordon’s metaphor suggests, the key characteristic of critical historicism 
was its apparent transfiguration of “legal history” by transcending the conceptual 
tension between its disciplinary components—“law” and “history.” Legal history 
had had few practitioners between the demise of the historical school at the turn 
of the twentieth century and the efflorescence of Hurst’s socio-legal paradigm fifty 
years later, but that had not prevented self-appointed guardians from policing the 
juridical field’s borders. In 1931, for example, Karl Llewellyn took to the Columbia 
Law Review to ridicule the young Richard Brandon Morris for his “depressing and 
grotesque” intrusions upon matters of law. Morris should have had “a careful 
professional go over his manuscript” to eliminate his “curious errors.”190 Twenty 
years later, Hurst himself echoed Llewellyn in observing that scholars without 
legal training who entered legal terrain would require “lawmen” to guide their 
 
186. FRANCIS BARKER, THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE: ESSAYS ON TRAGEDY AND HISTORY 
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187. Gordon, supra note 179, at 364–65. 
188. Gordon, supra note 98, at 1023, 1029. 
189. Id. at 1023. 
190. Llewellyn, supra note 145, at 729, 731. 
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expeditions clear of facile error born in ignorance.191 As more non-lawyer 
historians entered the field in the 1970s, John Reid took up the refrain, fearing, in 
1978, that innocents abroad in law would be gulled by Horwitz’s Transformation.192 
Another New York lawyer, Robert A. Ferguson, offered his own variation to greet 
the early twenty-first century.193 Whether it was the 1930s, the 1950s, the 1970s, or 
the 1990s the observation was the same: legal history might indeed benefit from 
the participation of outsiders—but only under the guidance of those trained in 
“the law.” Even CLS’s iconoclasts had voiced a certain ambivalence. We have 
already encountered the young Horwitz’s provocative observation that historians 
avoided encounters with legal history because of their fear of its technicalities.194 
Sotto voce, Robert Gordon had implied the same himself in downplaying the 
significance of history written at the field level of the socio-legal domain in favor 
of investigation of the legal consciousness of elites and their elaborated 
constructions of formal mandarin legality.195 Critical historicism, however, threw 
open the gates of the juridical field to all comers: “any approach to the past . . . 
that inverts or scrambles familiar narratives of stasis, recovery or progress; 
anything that advances rival perspectives . . . or that posits alternative trajectories 
that might have produced a very different present,” was admissible.196 When it 
came to law, history’s capacity to up-end had become limitless: “virtually all 
history as practiced by modern historians” bore critically upon law.197 
The exoticism of his metaphor notwithstanding, Gordon was unable to 
demonstrate that critical historicism actually represented any real break in the 
relationship between CLH and the “legally constructed domain” from which it 
sprang. Critical historicism’s “arrival” is announced to a legal audience in one of 
law’s elite spaces (the pages of the Stanford Law Review). Its desire for admission—
recognition of its “relevance”—is palpable. The encounter itself occurs within a 
closed system—hermetic, circular. By whom is the envoy received? One part of 
the juridical field. By whom accredited? Another part. For these best and brightest 
critical historicists are not really from “other genres” at all. The envoy is actually a 
delegation of five law professors (if we include Gordon) and a single 
constitutional historian—to lawyers, always the most tolerable breed of 
 
191. Garth, supra note 75, at 48. 
192. Reid, supra note 182, at 1321. 
193. Robert A. Ferguson, Reviews of Books, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 481 (2002). The best legal 
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concrete particularities of legal doctrine and legal procedure.” Id. at 482. Nothing was to be gained 
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194. See HORWITZ, supra note 169. 
195. Gordon, supra note 179. 
196. Gordon, supra note 98, at 1024. 
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historian.198 They have traveled from their various law schools to “City Central” to 
have their craft formally certified as an appropriate “category of intellectual 
practice” for law professors to pursue. Solemnly, the City has granted 
membership.  
Critical historicism’s arrival as savior to the project of writing CLH was a 
subtext to Gordon’s main claim, maintained consistently throughout his career as 
CLH’s historiographer, that CLH has always been subversive because it disrupts 
the mainstream modes of relationship between law and history—what I have here 
called the monumental, the antiquarian—that serve to reassure us “that what we 
do now flows continuously out of our past, out of precedents, traditions, fidelity 
to statutory and Constitutional texts and meanings.”199 CLH’s project had been 
temporarily derailed by the deviant doctrinalism preached during CLS’s playful 
heyday. Hence the subtext of escape: The new critical historicism that the Stanford 
Law Review symposium celebrated was no longer confined to doctrinal history. It 
was “any approach that unsettles the familiar strategies that we use to tame the 
past in order to normalize the present.”200  
On the reading so far, the “arrival” of critical historicism powerfully suggests 
that the history of law practiced and recognized within the juridical field remains a 
closed loop. Lawyers write history for their own purposes, whether critical or 
conventional. The most obvious of those purposes is to use history as a vehicle to 
commend, defend, reform, replace, or simply argue about, the rules. Within the 
juridical field, that is, history always ends up, ultimately, as a modality of 
jurisprudential debate. And jurisprudence, we have seen, is prescriptive.201 “When 
it is not pursuing the analytic question of the conditions of legal validity, 
contemporary jurisprudence is telling us how judges should rule or how regulatory 
regimes should work.”202 
Another reading allows a more generous conclusion. Legitimizing “any 
approach to the past” as long as it unsettles routines, Gordon argues, brings 
“virtually all history as practiced by modern historians” to bear on law.203 As such, 
critical historicism is a break in the trajectory of critical legal-historical scholarship, 
a departure from its former practices. It opens the juridical field to the whole 
range of disciplinary practices developed by professional historians, practices 
noted but as quickly forgotten in CLH’s rapid early 1980s slide from the social to 
the doctrinal. 
But how does “virtually all history”—the monumental? the antiquarian?—
 
198. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 169, at 275. 
199. Gordon, supra note 98, at 1023. 
200. Id. at 1024 (emphasis added). 
201. See text at note 18 supra. 
202. PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 1 (1999). 
203. Gordon, supra note 98, at 1024. 
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suddenly become critical history? Gordon’s claim for historical practice’s 
immanent criticality in the domain of law is founded on the proposition that 
professional historians’ purposes and working assumptions are in basic conflict 
with those of lawyers. History and law are distinct forms of expertise; historians 
and lawyers are distinct breeds of trained intellect. “Lawyers are monists, 
historians are pluralists.” That is, “lawyers want to recover a single authoritative 
meaning from a past act or practice while historians look for plural, contested, or 
ambiguous meanings.” Second, “Lawyers are overtly presentist: they want to bring 
past practices into the present to serve present purposes.” Historians are not 
interested in presentism, but difference—the dead past, the pastness of the past, 
the disparity between past and present, the breaks and “great epistemic shifts” that 
render past and present irreducibly discontinuous.204 
Both propositions are, I think, open to dispute. It is not difficult to think of 
monist histories, nor are they necessarily bad history nor necessarily “uncritical” 
because of it. (Can one think of a more monist history than Charles Beard’s 
decidedly critical Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States?)205 Nor 
is the identification of “history” with “the past” and its “difference” all that 
helpful. First, the very idea of a separated “past” is problematic. As Keith Jenkins 
observes, following Hayden White, the past as such has no accessible reality, no 
rhyme nor rhythm of its own. It is sublime—incomprehensible, uncontrollable, 
uncontrolled, disorderly. The past leaves only fragments or remnants that are 
already historicized in the very act of their preservation; that is, the remnants exist 
only because they are texts—archaeological, documentary, visual—from which 
“data” can be extracted and organized into other texts—chronicles and 
chronologies and narratives—which impose order and sequence on events and 
ideas using theories or assumptions or literary forms or common sense. From this 
perspective the past furnishes not history but only material “waiting to be 
appropriated with reference to the social formation wherein the appropriations are 
being variously legitimated.”206 Second, a sizeable proportion of modern history 
has in fact been composed in the course of present-minded searches for “usable 
pasts.”207 Indeed, the creation of histories that purport to explain a current present 
is, one assumes, a prime motivation for critical historians. Nor, finally, can the 
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temporality of history be confined to what’s done with, as if it could be contained. 
“The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant it can be 
recognized. . . . To articulate the past historically . . . means to seize hold of a 
memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.”208 As Barker has put it, history is 
the seizure of “that disturbing, critical irruption into the present.”209 
So the idea that “virtually all history as practiced by modern historians” is 
critical when mixed with law seems to me based on a dubious assumption of 
essentialist—as opposed to political, or strategic, or disciplinary (or all three 
together)—distinctions between lawyers and historians. History might well have 
the desired up-ending effect when introduced into legal discourse because to place 
distinct expertises in apposition will produce dissonance. But dissonance is not 
critique. History simply produces narratives of stasis and progress that are 
different from those produced by the expertise of law. 
More to the point, how in fact does modernity’s pluralist history, sensible of 
the past’s pastness, ambiguity, contingency, and so forth actually enliven the 
project of CLH? After all, the history practiced by virtually all modern historians 
embraces no expressly critical philosophical purpose: it does not put itself, for 
example, in the service of “life and action.” Indeed, the opposite. History’s current 
default definition of its own practice is entirely conventional: sequentialist in time, 
contextualist in method, and separatist in philosophy. “[I]t is the people of the 
1780s, not the people of 2006, that the historian is interested in.”210 The expertise 
of history sequesters past phenomena within a realm of context on the far side of 
a temporal cæsura where—“butterflies on pins”211—they serve no particular 
purpose at all. There is, that is, nothing necessarily “critical” that history 
introduces into the legal realm. Far more likely, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, one will simply reproduce professional history’s current preoccupation 
with complexity212—the production of an infinity of outcomes that will enable 
one to provide whatever “past” for law one desires, critical or apologetic, 
antiquarian or heroic. 
In fact, Gordon argues that the critical contribution of history is precisely 
plurality itself. “What is common to many of these approaches is that they treat 
law—meaning not just legal texts but legal instruments, processes, rituals, 
interactions, discourses—as cultural artifacts, imaginative constructs, historically 
contingent and perpetually contested and renegotiated.”213 But perpetual 
 
208. Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in WALTER BENJAMIN, 
ILLUMINATIONS 253, 255 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1969). 
209. BARKER, supra note 186, at 108.  
210. Gordon S. Wood, Righteous Anger, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/may/11/righteous-anger/ (last visited Nov. 12, 
2010). 
211. CONSTANTIN FASOLT, THE LIMITS OF HISTORY 151 (2004). 
212. See text accompanying notes 248–50 infra. 
213. Gordon, supra note 98, at 1029. 
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contingency is really of interest only to the intellectual, the “host of pure thinkers 
who only look on at life, of knowledge-thirsty individuals whom knowledge alone 
will satisfy and to whom the accumulation of knowledge is itself the goal.”214 
What the infinite plurality of modern (post-modern?) historical practice conveys is 
nothing so much as a new form of burial in the past. Once more “all that has ever 
been rushes upon mankind”—this time, not as “a science of universal 
becoming”215 but as a blizzard of atomized narratives that, all together, create a 
chaos of relativized possibilities, of happy/unhappy individualities. 
Modern (post-modern) historians’ desire to complexify is convivial to critical 
historicism precisely insofar as it reproduces and spreads wide the totalized 
contingency prized by the mandarin mode of critical doctrinal history. But 
unfortunately history that is infinitely interpretable, a history of niches that grants 
everyone their own history, is not critical history at all, but history dispersed, 
atomized, neutralized. “Virtually all history” is not a compelling conceptual-
organizational structure for the subject. It is an evasion of responsibility, both 
moral and political, to advance hypotheses, assign priorities, make causal 
statements, explain outcomes.  
Above all, critical history cannot be enlivened by history that is infinitely 
interpretable because infinite interpretation is a convenient means to overall 
indifference and forgetfulness. The critical historian’s job is remembrance and 
explanation. After alternative possibilities have been uncovered, lost voices 
allowed to speak, contingencies explored and so on, things still come out a certain 
way. We need to know why. “In ultimate epistemological senses it may [be 
necessary] to exercise some scepticism about [one’s] own groundedness, but this is 
quite different from beginning in a programmatic way from that lack of 
foundation.” Nor should we fear “general statements about the structure and 
transformation of history which are not rooted for their ‘truth’ . . . in a single and 
particular historical moment.” The point of such a metanarrative is to 
disemburden ourselves of “the dead weight of the apparent past in order that [we] 
may remember.”216  
When at the end of the nineteenth century, shortly before his death, Rudolf 
von Jhering wrote that legal history “should not content itself with telling what 
happened, what changes occurred” but that it should discover “the reason, the 
‘why,’ of the facts described, and the forces that underlie and determine the 
changes,” and also the causal relationships “between antecedent and subsequent 
facts,” between changes and other changes,217 he was describing a form of history 
grounded upon explanation. Like Pound, whom he influenced, Jhering wrote as a 
critic of nineteenth-century historical jurisprudence who was informed by 
 
214. NIETZSCHE, supra note 102, at 77. 
215. Id. 
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developments in the kindred disciplines (social science). Unlike Pound, he 
proposed not a new jurisprudence but a legal history emancipated from law, an 
independent explanatory discipline of its own. If the energy so evident in the 
second half of the twentieth century in the substantive conjunction between 
history and law is to be sustained into the twenty-first century, and especially if the 
conjunction is to provide the interpretive edge for study of law that CLH sought, 
an independent explanatory legal history seems essential. There is no need to 
adopt Jhering’s terms, positing underlying determinative forces, in order to 
achieve that objective. The world may indeed be “socially constructed” rather than 
materially “determined.” But that does not make it any the more malleable or 
objective causal explanation any the less consequential. Social constructions can 
prove immensely durable.218  
If, however, we are to seek an explanatory legal history, we must seek 
emancipation from the conventions of contemporary history as well as of law. 
When Nietzsche wrote of humanity’s need for a “rough and charmless” history he 
meant precisely a history that was not dedicated to the service of pure knowledge. 
“The superfluous is the enemy of the necessary.”219 At the beginning of the 
twenty-first century we can justifiably claim that both law and history encompass a 
great deal more knowledge than a hundred years ago. It is far less clear whether 
the “more” that is known stands in the service of life. 
IV. TOWARD A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF NATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICES 
In Parts 2 and 3 of this article, I have tried to demonstrate that the century 
of the historical school was followed by a half century of essential irrelevance for 
history vis-à-vis law, followed by a half century of resurgence, led first by the 
“externalist” scholarship of Willard Hurst, then by the revived doctrinalism of the 
Critical Legal Historians. Because these phases coincide roughly with those 
canvassed in Part I’s synoptic history of the juridical field it makes sense to ask 
what role history has played as a resource (a practice, a discourse) available for 
deployment as the juridical field has constituted and reconstituted itself. What 
does the form of history’s mobilization in the explanatory practices that have 
sustained or criticized law’s identity and effectivity tell us about each phase of the 
American juridical field’s development? 
History within the juridical field is history within a field of power that sets 
“the key terms of legitimacy.”220 When Willard Hurst invented modern American 
legal history, he did so by opening the discipline outward. Robert Gordon first 
employed his urban metaphor at the Hurstian peak, when he congratulated Hurst 
 
218. As we have seen, CLS/CLH acknowledged this in its early days. See, e.g., Gordon, supra 
note 79. Later statements, however, placed ever greater stress on the contingency of all social (and 
historical) phenomena. 
219. NIETZSCHE, supra note 102, at 59. 
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for lowering the drawbridge and “throw[ing] open the gates” of the city to traffic 
from general historiography.221 But Hurst, we saw, always thought the tourists 
needed an official guide, once inside, lest they wander into places they did not 
belong. Non-lawyers, Hurst said, would be “hampered chiefly by their ignorance, 
first, of the law’s jargon, and, secondly, of the techniques of reading between the 
lines so that one does not take more seriously than he should what the law 
declares.”222 The phrase “techniques of reading between the lines” is a particularly 
useful indicator that, for all its openings to the outside, the emphasis in Hurst’s 
historiography lay on maintaining the whip hand within the field. Such a reading is 
necessarily entirely subjective—not in other words a matter of technique at all, but 
art. And so it has remained. Law’s encounters with history reproduce the history 
of law’s disciplinary encounters in general. Law is receptive to encounters with 
disciplines that improve its capacity to explain itself, or refine its performance in 
setting the key terms of legitimacy. Law has shown far less interest in encounters 
with disciplines that instead intrude upon law’s terms for deployment of power 
and authority, reading not between the lines but anywhere they like, treating law as 
a subject, like any other.  
Investigation of the uses made of history within the juridical field refines our 
understanding of the ways in which the American juridical field composes and 
maintains law, and how in the process it ensures that its actions are perceived as 
effective and legitimate. In addition, investigation permits self-conscious 
refinement of history as a critical practice deployable in the enterprise identified by 
Dezalay and Garth as “explain[ing] the ‘rules for the production of the rules’” 
which I have embraced as the framework for this article.223 As Dezalay and Garth 
put it, “the content and the scope of rules produced to govern the state and the 
economy cannot be separated from the circumstances of their creation and 
production.”224 In America, rules of governance emerge in the course of 
interaction among distinct discourses, disciplines, and professions, but the 
interaction is one in which law, besides being a participant, also sets “the key 
terms of legitimacy.”225 All those who seek to influence the production of the 
rules (the process of formation and reformation of the rules that govern state and 
social action) assume the juridical field’s foundational character as a given. 
“[T]here is very little effort to explain the ‘rules for the production of the rules.’ 
Instead, the discourses within the disciplines tend to proceed in a quasi-legalistic 
mode, describing what the rules should be.”226 They do not discuss “what makes 
 
221. Gordon, supra note 35, at 54, 55. 
222. Garth, supra note 75, at 48 (quoting James Willard Hurst). 
223. Dezalay and Garth, supra note 28, at 311. 
224. Id. at 307. 
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the credibility of law” or “how the law is made.”227 They buy into law’s 
prescriptive discourse and, insofar as they try to go it one better, simply reproduce 
it. 
A different approach is necessary if we are to understand the rules that are 
produced. It is even more necessary if we are to understand how they are 
produced—“the production and legitimation of law itself”—for as we have 
already established, the production of rules is necessarily a process with formative 
rules of its own. “[T]he circumstances of production shape the range of 
possibilities that are likely to be contemplated and implemented—or ignored.”228 
To understand the rules produced, Dezalay and Garth argue, one must 
“examine their genesis—where they come from, what material was used to create 
them, and what conflicts were present at the time.”229 As they acknowledge, this 
means writing history. It is of course a truism that the law is historical, that current 
rules are a product of the past, recent or remote—“some ancient statute, or old 
writing of a court, or in the exposition by one of the old writers, from Glanvil or 
Bracton to Coke, Hale or Blackstone.”230 CLH, whatever its failings, successfully 
debunked that smooth, irreversible, linear temporality. But the history described 
here is different: inquiry into the rules for the production of the rules is nothing 
less than inquiry “into the structural history of the creation and production of 
national legal practices.”231 The subjects of that inquiry are “national histories and 
disciplinary evolutions”232—the institutional structures within which the 
production of rules occurs, the methods of research and theories of formation 
embraced by those who are engaged in rule production, and the networks through 
which their output becomes influence. 
To write this history of the juridical field necessarily includes writing the 
history of the field’s own legal-historical practices. The history of law has been an 
intellectual practice largely contained within the boundaries of the juridical field. 
But history, just like law and the social sciences, is also a mode of research and a 
theory of formation. History is rarely capable of producing specific rules of 
governance itself, but it certainly produces discourses of causation that powerfully 
contextualize the production of rules by others, and thus helps to define the 
terrain of rule production. History is a particularly powerful resource in the hands 
of the state and its agents, for it allows them to create broad narratives of necessity 
and progress to explain their actions, and thereby create a context within which 
more instrumentalist discourses can safely nest their recommendations.233 In 
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considering the construction of the rules for the production of the rules, then, it is 
crucial to pay attention to past uses made of history—legal and general—both as a 
modality of inquiry into law, and as a resource to which participants in the juridical 
field have turned to sustain the security and authority—maintain the meta-
character—of the juridical field itself.  
For the most part in the U.S. case, history written within the juridical field 
has provided justification for each successive iteration of the field. This was the 
role played by historical jurisprudence before Langdell, as it was in the case of later 
nineteenth-century histories of the Anglo-American common law tradition, 
Pound’s taught legal tradition, Hurst’s socio-legal empiricism, and even Critical 
Legal Studies’ new doctrinalism.234 Critical historicism’s embrace of “virtually all” 
history might, I have conceded, represent a departure, or it might be thought of as 
just another form of cooptation, or confinement, simply part of the general drift 
to methodological pluralism that has been the juridical field’s latest (though not 
uncontested235) self-reinvention. Assuredly, history within the juridical field is not 
merely dutiful in its performances. Multiple perspectives have existed within its 
overall trajectory. Even those modes of scholarship that have mobilized history 
for purposes of critique within the juridical field—Hurst’s external paradigm, 
Critical Legal History—have tended, however, to channel its forms to ensure that 
they serve internally defined prescriptive purposes.  
On the evidence of recent years, legal history outside the juridical field has 
become more fully attuned to critique than prescription, to the dismantling of 
processes of rule production so as to reveal “the rules for the production of the 
rules.” One can argue that this has occurred solely by default. Historians are only 
rarely members of the community of rule recommenders, although they can of 
course be found occasionally in the ranks of public intellectuals propagandizing 
for particular outcomes. The late nineteenth-century reorganization of inquiry did 
not constitute history as an instrumental social knowledge as it did the social 
sciences, and little has occurred since to alter that state of affairs. Dezalay and 
Garth note, following Wallerstein, that “the division of the roles of the disciplines 
is the product mainly of the nineteenth-century state. Political science thus focuses 
on national government . . . anthropology focuses on colonial relationships.”236 
History enjoys no similarly demarcated role. Unable, despite its best efforts, to 
 
as the new and dominant form of political subjectivity and power, established a tight 
connection that amounted to collaboration. With the founding of research universities in 
Europe and, in a more complicated way, in the United States, historians and humanities 
scholars produced national histories and certified national literatures and cultures, which in 
turn helped to sustain the project of making the modern nation-state. 
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develop a systematic (positivist) prescriptivism of its own, history has been left to 
choose among mythmaking, sheer description, and interpretation.237 It is perhaps 
not surprising that, even if only by default, attempts to understand “why law is 
what it is,” discussion of “what makes the credibility of law,” scrutiny of “the 
black box that produces the law and more generally the rules of the game for 
governance,” have an opportunity to creep onto its agenda.238  
V. CONCLUSION: INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND IRVINE’S NEW LAW SCHOOL 
Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May 
And summer’s lease hath all too short a date.239 
It remains, finally, to return to the question raised at the end of Part I; that is, 
to consider what bearing the examination undertaken in this article—of the 
development of the American juridical field and of the relationship of history to 
the juridical field—has on the country’s 200th law school and its interdisciplinary 
project.  
One way to understand the UC Irvine School of Law’s definition of its 
agenda is that it is nothing more than an expression of the most recent set of 
moves by which law seeks to maintain disciplinary and professional ascendancy 
vis-à-vis competing forms of expertise over the production of rules, and over the 
rules for the production of the rules. In the service of maintaining ascendancy, law 
as discipline has continuously oscillated between seeking modes of intellectual 
commonality with other disciplines, perceived as useful sources of intellectual and 
social capital, and fending them off. “Interdisciplinarity” can thus be understood 
as simply the latest in a set of relationships that over time has facilitated the 
absorption into the juridical field’s domain of as much disciplinary expertise from 
outside itself as necessary to sustain law’s overall purpose. Historically, we have 
seen, the juridical field has always appropriated whatever expertise it needs to 
survive and regenerate. As Pierre Schlag writes of CLS, for example: 
 
[P]art of [its] legacy . . . was to broaden the range of intellectual 
authorities and perspectives consulted in legal education and legal 
scholarship. Working alongside other tendencies, such as law and 
literature, law and economics, law and society, feminist jurisprudence, 
and postmodernism, CLS participated, for a time at least, in a broadening 
of the intellectual life of American law schools.240  
 
 
237. These three genres accord with Nietzsche’s division—the monumental, the antiquarian, 
and the critical. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 102, and text accompanying notes 114–122 supra. 
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240. Pierre Schlag, Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
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The interdisciplinary turn, we might conclude, exemplifies simply the adaptation 
of an old strategy to current conditions.  
That interdisciplinarity excites intense opposition within the juridical field—
witness, for instance, Robert Ferguson’s leaden contempt for the contemporary 
academy’s “cant about interdisciplinarity”241—does nothing to negate this analysis. 
Innovators in the field, from Langdell through the realists, through Law & Society, 
Law & Economics, and CLS, have always aroused vituperation. All have left deep 
imprints. To cite Schlag once more, the “anti-intellectual regression” of recent 
years notwithstanding, the various “broadening” tendencies of the past half-
century have meant that the American legal academy has become “less parochial 
and more theoretically sophisticated” than it was in the 1960s and 1970s.242 “Law 
and . . .” scholarship has proliferated. So have “dual degree” (J.D./Ph.D.) 
academics and degree programs, particularly at elite law schools. The result has 
been “a professionalization of legal scholarship—yielding work of greater 
methodological rigor.”243 In other words the juridical field has once again 
successfully invested in non-juridical expertise, enhanced its professional claims, 
improved the quality of its product (both scholarly and pedagogical) and, thereby, 
maintained its rulemaking ascendancy. 
When UC Irvine Law articulates its interdisciplinary and public service vision 
of “the ideal law school for the twenty-first century” it speaks quite precisely the 
language of legal-professional innovation through investment in expertise and in 
new areas of rule production for the juridical field to enter. Its claim is that it will 
do “the best job in the country of training lawyers for the practice of law at the 
highest levels of the profession” and that it is “uniquely positioned to build a new 
school that is relevant to law practice and legal scholarship in the twenty-first 
century and that pushes the frontiers of the profession.”244 These professional-
technocratic claims are married to a very traditional (since Langdell) regime of 
standards and selectivity: 
 
Drawn from top law schools across the country, UCI Law’s faculty has 
been ranked ninth in the nation in a recent study of scholarly impact. The 
law school’s high selectivity enabled it to field an inaugural class of 60 
students with a median grade point average and LSAT scores that put it 
on par with classes at law schools rated in the top twenty in the nation by 
U.S. News & World Report. The 84-member second class, the Class of 
2013, has comparable grades and test scores and is equally as impressive. 
Currently, students enjoy a faculty-to-student ratio of 6 to 1, which 
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ensures small classes and easy access to professors outside the 
classroom.245 
 
A second, potentially more interesting, way to understand the UCI Law 
phenomenon is to see it as something more than simply an expression of the 
juridical field’s passion for the latest in extrinsic techne to blend with its 
intrastructural poiesis, and instead situate it at the beginning of the next wave of 
innovation—which, as a beginning, necessarily has a certain ragged uncertainty to 
its eventual outcome. To return one more time to Schlag, this time on the distaff 
side, the past half-century’s “broadening” has excited reactive “regression”—“a 
return, even in elite institutions, to a prescriptive, largely doctrinal scholarship” 
that, though methodologically more sophisticated than in the past as a result of 
law schools’ widened intellectual horizons, nevertheless manifests “a kind of 
return to ‘scholastic’ irrelevance.”246 UCI Law’s desire to be “relevant to law 
practice and legal scholarship in the twenty-first century” might hint at a push 
back against the threat of regression to an irrelevant scholastic mean.247  
If so, what direction might that push take? One possibility is simply a 
redoubled effort to maintain the momentum of indiscriminate “broadening” in 
the face of “regression.” And indeed, that is more than likely, given the early 
twenty-first century academy’s preoccupation with “complexity.” Complexity is 
the current aesthetic not simply in history but across a whole array of fields of 
study. Its emphases—complete contingency, perpetual contest and continuous 
renegotiation248—are entirely at one with CLS’s indeterminacy thesis, which is 
perhaps why Schlag thinks reports of CLS’s death are somewhat exaggerated. “Its 
ideas . . . remain—an unfinished project, a dissident strain, ready to be 
activated.”249 Why, though, would one want to reactivate this particular strain? I 
have already argued that as an intellectual practice, complexity/indeterminacy 
produces nothing other than more of itself. As a professional legal-academic 
practice, meanwhile, CLS assisted the juridical field’s self-renewal—which, though 
it might have been an outcome unintended, does not exactly count as 
dissidence.250  
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I have argued that the alternative to complexity is the production of 
explanation. The default setting for “explanation” in legal studies is actually the 
original positivist version of “law and . . .” popularized by the early Law & Society 
movement during the movement’s initial phase outside the juridical field. “Law 
and . . .” relies on empirical context to situate law as a domain of activity. First 
mooted at the turn of the twentieth century, encouraged by the realists, “law and  . 
. .” considers law’s most important determinative context to be the social, and the 
social to be empirically verifiable, such that law is held to be an empirical and 
social phenomenon. Hence it explains law and legal outcomes through their 
relations to cognate but distinct domains of action—society, polity, economy, 
human behavior, and motivation—by parsing the interactions among them. 
Though shaken by the era of “critique” that substituted complexity for causal 
explanation, “law and . . .” was never laid to rest, and in recent years has taken on 
renewed vigor in the form of two variations on the theme, Empirical Legal Studies 
(ELS) and New Legal Realism (NLR). ELS and NLR manifest significant 
differences. According to a recent and authoritative assessment, “ELS’s 
methodological vision is more quantitative than qualitative, more confirmatory 
than exploratory, and more contemporary than historical.”251 NLR is eclectic—
open “to a wide range of social science methods and theories,” rather than 
ordaining any particular methodology, and favoring “a ‘ground level up’ 
perspective” that “embraces qualitative as well as quantitative work.”252 Where 
ELS favors “quantitative technique, topical immediacy, and definitive hypothesis 
testing,” NLR attempts to “balance formal law and context, combine multiple 
methods, and eschew oversimplifying assumptions.”253 Their differences 
notwithstanding, ELS and NLR are united by a common emphasis on empirical 
research and common claims to a heritage in legal realism and “law and . . .” 
Though it is perhaps unnecessary to make the point, given the argument of this 
article, both “are best understood as efforts to legitimate empirical research within 
the legal academy itself.”254 
In its Hurstian (pre-critique) mode, legal history also exhibited the influence 
of “law and . . .” through its resort to synchronic relational metaphors of 
conjunction/disjunction, to which it added diachronic temporality as a further and 
essential relational index. Methodologically, legal history in this mode approached 
phenomena by situating them in temporally discrete empirical contexts (for 
example, periods), and attempted to reveal the effect of law, or to explain the 
reality of law, by assessing change over time in law vis-à-vis the contextualizing 
 
to changing them!” See Gordon, supra note 77, at 4, 9. 
251. Elizabeth Mertz and Mark Suchman, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies 
and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 555, 558 (2010). 
252. Id. at 561–62. 
253. Id. at 562–63. 
254. Id. at 556 . 
Loftus_Geis_Macro_v1 (Do Not Delete) 3/16/2011 11:31 AM 
244 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:1 
 
domain (whether society, polity, or economy) from which it was held relationally 
distinct. As a participant in the practice of “law and . . .”, legal historical 
scholarship has broadly relied for its animating problematics upon the same 
relational hypotheses that at successive moments over the last half-century 
preoccupied “law and . . .” theory: the autonomy/instrumentalism opposition; the 
relative autonomy compromise; and more recently the varieties of “constitutive” 
theorizing, notably legal constitutiveness (law constitutes social processes) and 
mutual constitutiveness (law is at one and the same time constitutive of and 
constituted by social processes). Legal history also drew on “law and . . .” 
scholarship’s matching range of relational characterizations (functionalism, 
managed conflict, coercion-resistance, legitimation-disruption, agency-
disempowerment) and distributive effects (plurality, equilibrium, efficiency, 
utility).255 When it comes to the most recent innovations in “law and . . .”—ELS 
and NLR—legal history generally has more in common with NLR. It exhibits the 
same methodological eclecticism and the same “emergent style of inquiry, 
consonant with pragmatism, in which investigators move between theory and 
empirical research with each informing the other,” and embraces the same 
“recursive” (mutually influential) relationship between law and society.256 It is not 
difficult, however, to imagine legal historical research in conformity with the 
quantitative, confirmatory emphases of ELS.  
Participation in “law and . . .” theorizing has been highly productive in legal-
historical scholarship. Still, even though the turn to complexity that resulted from 
CLS’s critique of “law and . . .” has proven barren, the critique itself was 
nonetheless devastating. In its default mode, “law and . . .” produced a causally 
functional and empirical account of law. CLS showed that whatever the realm of 
action in relation to which law is situated, the outcome was the same—
indeterminacy marked by complexity and contingency. Critique did not dispense 
with the components of the default account (“law” and “society”): that is, it did 
not produce a new account. It simply made any and every expression of the 
received account inexpressible in causal or functional terms. The turn away from 
critique to empiricism represented by ELS and NLR has not resolved this 
problem, but instead has elided it: essentially, ELS’s “quantitative technique, 
topical immediacy, and definitive hypothesis testing” reproduce the functionalism 
of the original default mode; NLR’s attempts to “balance formal law and context, 
combine multiple methods, and eschew oversimplifying assumptions,” meanwhile, 
situate NLR not in contradistinction to the fetishization of complexity but actually 
as a revised expression of it. 
Empiricism, in short, will not of itself help us steer past “law and . . .” while 
 
255. These problematics and relational characterizations are discussed at greater length in 
Tomlins, How Autonomous, supra note 26. 
256. Mertz and Suchman, supra note 251, at 562. 
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simultaneously avoiding steering into the complexity fetish. An attempt at new 
theorizing might. Suppose we try dispensing with theory built from the 
conjunctive metaphors of the relational approach and its (broken) conception of 
causality and instead reach for different metaphors and the explanatory 
possibilities they imply. What would they be? One possibility is optical 
metaphors—that is, metaphors of seeing, of “looking like” (or unlike), of focal 
length (blurring), of “scope.” Instead of parsing relations between distinct 
domains of activity, between law and what is extrinsic to it, the objective of optical 
theory would be to imagine them as the same domain: what do we get if we 
imagine law and economy (for example) as the same phenomenon—that is, law as 
economy, or economy as law?257 It is noticeable that we seem to have no difficulty 
in thinking of law optically in some domains but not in others: for example, law as 
expertise seems to pose less current conceptual dissonance than law as society. 
Complementing theory that starts from optical conceptions is theory that 
starts from conceptions of scale. As Annelise Riles has written, “an implicit notion 
of scale—of the difference between large and small—is a crucial foundation for 
the effect of perspective.”258 Perspective is “a way of looking”259 that both actors 
and observers can vary according to the results they desire to produce. But, Riles 
observes, modern knowledge tends to assume that whatever the perspective (for 
example the global, the local) scale is a constant. What, then, should one make of 
“movement between levels of scale that itself sometimes collapses scale and 
sometimes reconstructs it”?260 How does placing scale at the center of our 
problematic, instead of assuming its constancy, rebound on perspective? 
Perspective, from the standpoint of modern knowledge, whether conventional or 
critical, is taken “to be perspective on something, something that itself is not a 
perspective but rather a kind of raw material for observation,” but once one notes 
the inconstancy of scale, perspective becomes “its own subject matter . . . the act 
of viewing and the material that is viewed are one and the same.”261  
For purposes of investigation resulting in explanation, finally, scope and 
scale must be made elements of the same theoretical conjuncture. How? By 
turning to a revived conception of structure. I have already had resort to 
structuralist concepts in embracing Bourdieu’s theory of the juridical field and 
recommending the possibilities inherent in “a structural history of national legal 
practices.” How, though, avoid the criticism of structuralist theory as merely a 
static model of motion reliant upon “underlying social forces”?262 By resort to an 
 
257. For one suggestive set of examples, see JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW 
CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1999). 
258. Annelise Riles, The View from the International Plane: Perspective and Scale in the Architecture of 
Colonial International Law, 6 L. & CRITIQUE 39, 40 (1995). 
259. Id. at 48. 
260. Id. at 50. 
261. Id. at 54. 
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older structuralism, notably Walter Benjamin’s notion of constellation which, by 
allowing us to comprehend structure both imagistically and temporally, inserts 
history at the very center of theory. Constellation stands for the synchronicity not 
of objects in time but of objects with time and with their observer, who (as Riles 
has emphasized) stands at a point of particularity. The point is made in Benjamin’s 
essay on Eduard Fuchs: “[A]ny consideration of history worthy of being called 
dialectical . . . [requires the researcher] to abandon the calm, contemplative 
attitude toward his object in order to become conscious of the critical 
constellation in which precisely this fragment of the past finds itself with precisely 
this present.”263 Benjamin’s dialectics were devoted not to theoretical mediation of 
relations among underlying forces but to surfaces and to the construction of 
representation—“the thread of [allegorical] expression” that created images by 
conjoining moments.264 Benjamin’s historical materialism was, hence, “a given 
experience”—the past in the experience of now : 265  
 
Every present is determined by those images which are synchronic with it: 
every now is the moment of a specific recognition. . . . It isn’t that the 
past casts its light on the present or the present casts its light on the past; 
rather an image is that in which the past and the present moment flash 
into a constellation. In other words, image is dialectic at a standstill.266 
 
Dialectic at a standstill is the constellation of scope and scale in structure, a 
non-relational (monadic) theory of representation that creates a distinct and 
historical account of relationality. That account beckons legal studies in two 
directions. First, the very tenacity of the conjunctive conceptualizations that 
underpin both modernity’s “law and . . .” theorization and its postmodern 
apotheosis—complexity—lead one to the question, why did differentia of 
appearance (of economy, polity) come about? How did they become so powerful? 
By examining the production of differentiation we are led to questions of purpose 
and effect. As law came to be distinguished in its appearance from cognate 
phenomena, what optics, aesthetics, functions, or claims did it take up to further 
its project, and why? How was its own differentiation represented within or 
explained by law? Such an agenda suggests that the objective is not to “get rid” of 
relationality or to challenge the familiar domains of polity, society, and economy, 
but to discuss whether current relational theorizations have indeed become 
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insufficient for the purposes of legal history and to explore what other 
theorizations might offer.  
But the legal theorist might also take this theory of representation further, to 
the point where one imagines law as a system of allegorical representation that 
completely displaces (renders inaccessible) what is being represented. What would 
“law and . . .” become if relationality were foreclosed? How would our 
perspectives on familiar domains change if the economic, the social, the political 
could be imagined only from and in law? How would law’s familiar cognates 
appear? 
Traveling via critique, we have arrived at an intellectual moment in which, a 
century after its invention, wide cracks have appeared in the relational perspective 
on law. Interdisciplinarity stands for a number of possible outcomes in response: 
simply more of the same (the indiscriminate “broadening”/complexity strand); a 
refined empiricism (the ELS/NLR strand); or an effort to develop new theory (the 
“scope/scale/structure” strand). Though the different strands have different 
implications, whichever strand one follows one is more or less fated to play some 
kind of role in the perennial quest of the juridical field for self-renewal. 
There is a place for history in the development of each of these three 
strands. It will be clear that I think the third “theorizing” strand has the most to 
offer. At the turn of the twentieth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and 
Roscoe Pound substituted society for history as law’s principal signifier as a 
matter, so to speak, of policy. They fated legal history to become what, in due 
course, it has indeed become—an account of relationality. Perhaps we have 
arrived at a juncture at which history can once again undertake to do something 
more substantial. Perhaps that is why, here at Irvine, history was identified as a 
central component of the ideal interdisciplinary law school’s intellectual 
equipment. Or so I like to think. 
  
